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ABSTRACT 
 
Africa seemingly cursed with instability, conflict and gross human rights 
violations has been the largest scene of operation of international criminal 
justice. This understanding led African States to be some of the key proponents 
in the push for an International Criminal Court. Of late however, mounting 
policy and operational fluxes between African States and international criminal 
justice has put Africa‟s relationship with international justice on ice. This in turn 
has awoken within the region‟s geopolitical body, the African Union, the need 
for an exclusively African response to international criminal justice as it is 
currently considering extending the jurisdiction of the African Court of Justice 
and Human Rights to cover international crimes. This Research Paper aims to 
chart the genesis of this move through the decision-making system of the 
African Union and within the broader context of the Union‟s emerging Human 
Rights, Peace and Security Architecture. It will simultaneously assess the 
viability of this proposal within the backdrop of recent global developments with 
a view to identifying key legal and policy ramifications. It aims to show that 
there may be room for the adoption of an empowered African Court as a 
regional complement to the international criminal justice system.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
TAKING STOCK: THE RATIONALE AND OPERATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AFRICA 
 
 
1.1. Introduction to the Study  
The last half century has seen Africa ravaged by perpetual cycles of conflict. 
This protracted state of conflict has made Africa the scene of numerous 
gregarious human rights violations. Countries like Angola, Burundi, Chad, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Somalia, 
Uganda and Zimbabwe are often synonymous with conflict, dictators, pirates, 
ethnic cleansing, genocide and other adjectives of ghastly savagery. It is 
estimated that more than half of the world‟s ongoing conflicts are played out in 
Africa, with the Continent hosting the largest number of failed states.1 
Currently, seven of the 16 United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations are 
carried out in Africa.2  
International criminal law which seeks to hold accountable those most to bear 
for the commission of mass violations has found relevance as one response to 
                                                 
1 See „Africa: Seven Nations Named in Top Ten 'Failed States'‟ available at 
http://allafrica.com/stories/201006240615.html (accessed 30 October 2011).   
2 See „Current Peacekeeping Operations‟ available at 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/current.shtml (accessed 30 October 
2011).   
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stymie impunity that has been prevalent on the Continent.  Garnered by this 
understanding, Africans and African States were some of the largest 
protagonists in the push for the creation of the International Criminal Court 
(ICC), in what was a watershed moment for international criminal justice.3  The 
West African nation of Senegal was the first country to ratify4 the Rome Statute 
establishing the ICC and to date, African States Parties represent the largest 
regional membership bloc to the ICC.5  
Yet of late, tensions have begun to emerge between African States and 
international criminal justice actors. The African Union (AU) the region‟s 
geopolitical body has queried, and holds serious reservations on the abuse of 
                                                 
3 Mochocko P „Africa and the International Criminal Court‟ in Ankumah E & Kwakwa E 
(eds) African Perspectives on international criminal justice (2005) 13.  
4 Senegal ratified the Rome Statute on 2 February 1999 some six months after the 
entry into force of the Rome Statute. See „Senegal‟ available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/Menus/ASP/states+parties/African+States/Senegal.htm (accessed 30 October 
2011).   
5 33 African States are party to the Rome Statute representing 27% of the total 119 
States Parties to the Rome Statute. Of the other States Parties, 17 are Asian States, 
18 are from Eastern Europe, 26 from Latin America and Caribbean States and 25 
from Western Europe and other States. See „The States Parties to the Rome Statute‟ 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ASP/states+parties/ (accessed 30 October 2011).   
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the principle of universal jurisdiction,6 the (mis)use of United Nations Security 
Council (UNSC) powers within the context of the Rome Statute,7 prosecutorial 
bias in situations under investigation and cases before the ICC and supposed 
imposition of western norms in conflict resolution in Africa, which have been 
branded as a new face of neo-colonialism.8 The height of these tensions was 
palpable in 2009 when the AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government 
took the decision not to cooperate with the ICC in the arrest of the Sudanese 
President Omar al Bashir following his indictment by the Court.9  
In response to these issues and as part of its emerging Peace and Security 
Architecture and evolving Human Rights System, the AU has begun taking 
                                                 
6 See generally Jalloh C „Universal Jurisdiction, Universal Prescription? A Preliminary 
Assessment of the African Union Perspective on Universal Jurisdiction‟ (2010) 
Criminal Law Forum Volume 21 No. 1 11-54. 
7 See generally Akande D, du Plessis A & Jalloh C Position Paper – An African Expert 
Study on the African Union Concerns about Article 16 of the Rome Statute of the ICC 
(2010).  
8 See Mandhani M „Darfur, ICC and the New Humanitarian Order: How the ICC‟s 
“responsibility to protect” is being turned into an assertion of neo-colonial domination‟ 
available at http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/features/50568 (accessed 30 
October 2011).   
9 Decision of the Meeting of African States Parties to the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, Doc Assembly/AU/13 (XIII), Sirte, 1–3 July 2009, 10.  
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active steps towards empowering its key judicial organ, the African Court of 
Justice and Human Rights with an international criminal justice mandate.10  
The main aim of the research is to assess the genesis, development and 
possible contribution of an empowered African Court within the international 
criminal justice sphere. In doing so, this Research Paper has been divided into 
five parts. Chapter one shall set the context by presenting an introduction to the 
issues, specifically the rationale for the operation of international criminal 
justice in Africa. Chapter two shall document and analyse the concerns of the 
AU and some of the emerging tensions between the Union and international 
criminal justice as detailed in some of the key decisions of the Union. Part three 
shall introduce the reader to the AU and its emerging Peace and Security 
Architecture and Human Rights System which are aimed at preventing and 
managing conflict on the Continent. Chapter four shall discuss the proposed 
measures to empower the African Court with an international criminal 
jurisdiction by examining elements of the Draft Protocol to extend the Court‟s 
jurisdiction focusing on its salient features specifically the broad range of new 
regionalised international crimes proposed. This chapter shall also concurrently 
present a critical analysis of the main issues in the extension process and delve 
into the viability and possible relevance of the empowered African Court to the 
international justice sphere. The concluding chapter shall summarise the 
observations and provide concluding recommendations.  
                                                 
10 Decision on the Implementation of the Assembly Decision on the Abuse of the 
Principle of Universal Jurisdiction, Decision Assembly/AU/Dec. 213(XII), Addis Ababa, 
1-3 February 2009, 9.  
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1.2. The Connection between Good Governance, Rule of Law, 
Human Rights and International Criminal Law 
As noted above, Africa has experienced some of the worst conflicts of modern 
history. Whilst the causes of conflict in Africa can be attributed to an interplay of 
numerous historic, socio-economic and political factors, its cyclical and 
protracted nature can be attributed to a few well known causes. These include 
bad governance, corruption, and the lack of respect for human rights and rule 
of law.  
In an attempt to break with the scourge of conflict and give the Continent a new 
lease on life, African States voted to transform the Organisation of African Unity 
(OAU) into the AU. The Constitutive Act of the re-emerged AU which came into 
force in 2002, identified the need to promote fundamental principles such as 
the protection of human and peoples' rights, the consolidation of democratic 
institutions and culture, and entrenching good governance and the rule of law in 
an effort to prevent conflict and as a prerequisite for the implementation of the 
Continent‟s development agenda.11 The Constitutive Act went on to include the 
novel provision of Article 4(h) which provides for the right of the AU to intervene 
in a Member State in the case of grave circumstances.   
Declaring 2010 as the “Year of Peace”, the AU observed that it is only with the 
promotion the above ideals that true stability can be achieved on the Continent. 
However, it is not just on basis of political whims or rhetoric that the AU has 
placed an emphasis on the promotion its fundamental principles. These 
                                                 
11 Preamble to the Constitutive Act of the African Union.  
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concepts are also relevant at a practical level in relation to the prevention of 
conflict and the application of international criminal law. 
With regard to the respect for human rights, Than C and Shorts E assert, 
“…there is a clear, visible cross-pollination between international criminal law, 
international humanitarian law and international human rights law which are 
essentially different perspectives of the same problem.”12 The assignment of 
individual criminal responsibility is a direct extension to the individual of 
obligations that ordinarily would accrue to the state. This concept of 
individualisation of state responsibility can also be drawn from the history of 
international criminal law. The Nuremburg Tribunal most poignantly stated, 
“…crimes against international law are committed by men, not by abstract 
entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the 
provisions of international law be enforced.”13 
The notion at the heart of the ideal of the rule of law is that nobody is above the 
law. This means that the process for determining the content of the law should 
be widely agreed within a given society and the use of force should be 
exercised in accordance to the law.14 This is important as “...conflict is often 
characterized by the misuse or abuse of power, accompanied by the use of 
                                                 
12 Than C & Shorts E International Criminal Law and Human Rights (2003) 12.   
13 Judgment of 1 October 1946 in The Trial of German Major War Criminals at the 
International Military Tribunal sitting at Nuremberg, Germany at 447.   
14 Bowden B, Charlesworth H & Farrall J (eds) The Role of International Law in 
Rebuilding Societies After Conflict  - Great Expectations (2009) 137. 
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forceful or deadly means to impose one‟s own views upon others”.15 In the 
context of Africa, the arbitrary use of force has led to human rights violations 
that have in turn fallen under the radar of international criminal law, the events 
of the 2010/2011 Arab Spring/ Uprisings being case in point.  
With respect to good governance, the UN defines good governance as a 
concept that “...promotes equity, participation, pluralism, transparency, 
accountability and the rule of law, in a manner that is effective, efficient and 
enduring.”16 In the context of Africa, good governance is further seen as 
relating to “...promoting democratic culture and practice, building and 
strengthening governance institutions and inculcating political pluralism and 
tolerance.”17 With specific respect to democratic governance, the African 
Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance states that 
“...unconstitutional changes of governments are one of the essential causes of 
insecurity, instability and violent conflict in Africa.”18  
Current trends point to bad governance as a primary cause of conflict. 
Unconstitutional changes of government and bad governance have been 
behind conflicts in Côte d‟Ivoire , Kenya and Zimbabwe while armed rebellions 
                                                 
15 Bowden B, Charlesworth H & Farrall J (eds) The Role of International Law in 
Rebuilding Societies After Conflict (2009) 139.  
16 See „Governance‟ available at http://www.un.org/en/globalissues/governance/ 
(accessed 30 October 2011).   
17 Article 2(6) of the African Charter on Democracy Elections and Governance.   
18 Preamble to the African Charter on Democracy Elections and Governance.  
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in response to a lack of democracy and political pluralism have been behind 
conflicts in Uganda and Libya.  
The concept of the overlap of the above norms is important to observe in the 
African context as it has formed part of the conceptual narrative of the AU‟s 
response to preventing conflict. However, as will be discussed below where 
respect for these ideals has been inadequate, international criminal law has 
intervened.  
 
1.3. The Role of International Criminal Law in Africa  
Since Africa does not have a continental criminal tribunal and since most 
African states are either ill equipped or unwilling to prosecute international 
crimes, these crimes have often been referred to ad hoc courts, the ICC or 
prosecuted under the principle of universal jurisdiction.19  
 
1.3.1. The Role of Ad Hoc Courts  
Two African States Rwanda and Sierra Leone are currently subject to the 
jurisdiction of ad hoc courts, the United Nations International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda (ICTR) and the United Nations Special Court for Sierra Leone 
(SCSL) respectively.  
                                                 
19 Bangamwabo F „International criminal justice and the protection of human rights in 
Africa‟ in Bösl A & Diescho J (eds) Human Rights in Africa Legal Perspectives in their 
Protection and Promotion (2009) 106.   
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The ICTR was set up under the United Nations Security Council‟s (UNSC) 
Chapter VII powers to restore and maintain international peace and security in 
the wake of the 1994 Rwandan genocide that left close to 1 million dead.20 The 
Tribunal which has its seat in Arusha, Tanzania21 was established to try those 
most culpable of the commission genocide, crimes against humanity and war 
crimes of a non international character.22 To date it has indicted 92 individuals 
and successfully prosecuted 47 although nine accused remain at large.23 It 
operations continue with 20 ongoing trials although it has begun to be wound 
down in accordance with its Completion Strategy and will be replaced with a 
branch of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals 
(IRMCT). 
On 22 December 2010 the UNSC adopted Resolution 1966 creating a Residual 
Mechanism for the ICTR and ICTY in which it urged the completion of all work 
of the Tribunals by 31 December 2014.  The IRMCT is aimed to be a “…small, 
temporary and efficient structure” that would continue the jurisdiction, rights and 
                                                 
20 UN Security Council Resolution 955, UN Doc S/RES/955 (1994).  
21 UN Security Council Resolution 977, UN Doc S/RES/977 (1995).  
22 See Articles 2, 3 and 4 of the Statute of the United Nations International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda. 
23 See „Status of cases‟ available at 
http://www.unictr.org/Cases/StatusofCases/tabid/204/Default.aspx (accessed 30 
October 2011).   
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obligations of the ICTR.24 It shall have its own trial chambers but share the 
appellate division, registry and be serviced by a common prosecutor.25 With the 
Arusha Branch of the IRMCT set to commence operations on July 1, 201226 
and with no new arrests of accused, first instance trials have come to a close at 
the ICTR in accordance with the transitional provisions of the IRMCT. Notably, 
the mechanism has no powers to issues fresh indictments,27 meaning and any 
new trials would have to be referred to national courts.28  
The SCSL is another ad hoc court in operation in Africa similarly set up under 
the UNSC Chapter VII powers at the request of the Sierra Leonean 
Government.29  It was established to try those who bore the greatest 
                                                 
24 Preamble to UN Security Council Resolution 1966, UN Doc S/RES/1966 (2010).  
25 Article 4 of the Statute of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal 
Tribunals.  
26 UN Security Council Resolution 1966, UN Doc S/RES/1966 (2010), 1.  
27 Article 1(5) of the Statute of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal 
Tribunals. 
28 Annex 2 of the Statute of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal 
Tribunals.  
29 This followed the request of Sierra Leonean President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah to the 
UN Secretary General for help to try those responsible for crimes committed during the 
Sierra Leonean war. The UNSC 14 August 2000 adopted Resolution 1315 requesting 
the Secretary General to negotiate an agreement with the government in Sierra Leone 
to establish an independent special court. An agreement between the UN and the 
Government of Sierra Leone establishing the court was entered into on 16 January 
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responsibility for crimes against humanity, war crimes of a non international 
character, other serious violations of international law and certain crimes under 
Sierra Leonean domestic law during the Sierra Leone‟s civil war.30  In this 
sense the SCSL is notably different as it adopted a both municipal and 
international law. The SCSL indicted 13 persons for serious violations of 
international humanitarian law most notably former president Charles Taylor 
making it the first Court in the history of international criminal law to prosecute a 
former African head of state .31  
The ad hoc Courts in operation in Africa have contributed greatly to the 
development of an international criminal justice system.  The ICTR for example 
is credited for the development and expansion the contemporary understanding 
of genocide law establishing that rape when perpetrated in a particular manner 
may constitute genocide.32 The Tribunal also successfully prosecuted hate 
speech and incitement in the famous Media Trial against the owners of „Radio 
                                                                                                                                              
2002. See Schabas W The UN International Criminal Tribunals: The Former 
Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Sierra Leone (2006) 35.  
30 See Articles 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the Statute of the United Nations Special Court for 
Sierra Leone. 
31 See „About the Special Court for Sierra Leone‟ available at http://www.sc-
sl.org/ABOUT/tabid/70/Default.aspx (accessed 30 October 2011).   
32 The Prosecutor v. Jean Paul Akayesu (ICTR-96-4-T).  
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Télévision Libre des Mille Collines,‟ a Rwandan radio station that broadcast 
genocidal propaganda.33  
The ad hoc Courts have also influenced the approach of international criminal 
justice towards outreach, victim and community participation. A common 
critique levelled against international criminal justice is that it is often removed 
from the theatres of violence. This critique has been levelled against the ICTY 
and ICC which are both situated at The Hague, far from the states of 
commission. The SCSL in this sense cut against the grain and was established 
in Freetown, the capital of Sierra Leone which was often a battleground during 
the civil war.   
The ICTR although seated in Arusha provides for in situ proceedings, a 
concept that has been replicated by the ICC.34 These courts have also 
extended their reach by opening field offices and conducting outreach 
programmes.35 These developments have been important in promoting the 
restorative role of international criminal justice and fostering peace and 
reconciliation.  
                                                 
33 The Prosecutor v. Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza and Hassan 
Ngeze (ICTR-99-52-T).  
34 See Article 3(3) of The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. The ICC 
has twice considered holding part of its proceedings in situ in respect of the situations 
in the DRC and Kenya.    
35 Dieng A „International Criminal Justice from Paper to Practise – A Contribution from 
the International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda to the International Criminal Court‟ 
(2001) Volume 25 Issue 3 Fordham International Law Journal 700. 
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1.3.2. The International Criminal Court 
Africa has taken stage at the ICC. Currently, all of the seven situations before 
the Court are from African States namely the Central African Republic (CAR), 
Côte d‟Ivoire, DRC, Kenya, Sudan, Uganda and Libya.  The Prosecutor has 
also opened preliminary investigations in the Republic of Guinea36 and 
Nigeria.37   
Out of the seven situations, the Court has issued 26 indictments, opened 11 
cases with four currently on trial.38 The Court has issued warrants of arrest for 
individuals who remain at large most prominently Sudanese President Bashir, 
                                                 
36 See „ICC Prosecutor confirms situation in Guinea under examination‟ available at  
http://www.icc-
cpi.int/menus/icc/structure%20of%20the%20court/office%20of%20the%20prosecutor/
comm%20and%20ref/guinea/icc%20prosecutor%20confirms%20situation%20in%20g
uinea%20under%20examination (accessed 30 October 2011). 
37 See „Nigeria‟ available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Structure+of+the+Court/Office+of+the+Prosecutor/Comm+and+Ref/
Nigeria/ (accessed 30 October 2011).   
38 The cases on trial are The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo 
Chui (ICC-01/04-01/07), The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo (ICC-01/05 -
01/08) and The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (ICC-01/04-01/06). See 
generally „Situations and cases‟ available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Situations+and+Cases/ (accessed 30 October 2011).  
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Lord‟s Resistance Army (LRA) leader Joseph Kony and Saif Gaddafi son of 
former Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi.39  
   
1.3.3. Universal Jurisdiction 
Universal jurisdiction refers to the powers of courts in states with no traditional 
link or direct interest to crimes to try international crimes.40 Over the past 
decade universal jurisdiction has been used to try international crimes 
especially given the inability or unwillingness of African States. To date, no 
African State has effectively prosecuted a case under universal jurisdiction.41 
This statistic has been most evident in the failure of Senegal to prosecute 
former Chadian President Hissene Habré after the AU mandated the West 
African nation to prosecute him on behalf of Africa.42  
Prosecutions under universal jurisdiction have mostly been carried out in 
Western States. They include the successful conviction of Désiré Munyaneza, 
a Rwandan businessman who was found guilty for war crimes by the Québec 
                                                 
39 See generally „Situations and cases‟ available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Situations+and+Cases/ (accessed 30 October 2011).  
40 Werle G Principles Of International Criminal Law 2 ed (2009) 64.  
41 The AU-EU Expert Report on the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction, Council of the 
European Union 8672/1/09 REV 1, 16.  
42 See Jalloh H & Bensouda F „International criminal law in an African context‟ in du 
Plessis M (ed) African Guide to International Criminal Justice (2008) 27.   
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Superior Court for his role in arming Interahamwe militias during the 1994 
Rwandan genocide.43 The prosecution of two other Rwandan nationals Ignace 
Murwanashyaka and Straton Musoni have also been commenced in Germany 
for alleged crimes committed in Eastern Congo.44  
 
1.3.4. Domestication of International Criminal Law 
Recent initiatives such as the creation of domestic courts that apply 
international criminal law present a new front on the localisation of international 
criminal law in Africa. One such initiative is the International Crimes Division 
(ICD) formerly known as the War Crimes Division of the High Court of Uganda.  
Uganda has a bloody history that has been marred by violence and a civil war 
spanning 20 years between the government and the LRA. Part of this conflict 
was referred to the ICC by the government of Uganda, and arrest warrants are 
still outstanding for Joseph Kony and three others.  
In 2007, the Ugandan government concluded the Juba Peace Agreement 
which sought to bring an end to hostilities and establish formal and informal 
                                                 
43 See „R. v. Désiré Munyaneza‟ available at 
http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/eCache/DEF/10/673.html  (accessed 30 October 
2011).   
44 See „A Test for Universal Jurisdiction War Crimes in Africa on Trial in Germany‟ 
available at http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,760825,00.html 
(accessed 30 October 2011).   
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accountability and reparations mechanisms.45 Pursuant to the agreement, in 
2008 Uganda created the War Crimes Division of the High Court that would 
oversee the prosecution of LRA rebels arrested for committing international 
crimes during the civil war.46 Its jurisdiction was expanded in 2011 to include 
genocide, crimes against humanity, terrorism, human trafficking and piracy and 
it was subsequently renamed the International Crimes Division.47 The ICD 
derives its source law from domestic criminal law, Hague Law and the Ugandan 
International Crimes Act, the domesticated version of the Rome statute.48  
The ICD has recently heard its first case against former LRA commander 
Colonel Thomas Kwoyelo.  After Kwoyelo‟s defence raised the argument that 
the accused had been granted an amnesty and was constitutionally 
safeguarded from prosecution, the ICD referred the matter to the Constitutional 
                                                 
45 See „Frequently Asked Questions on the International Crimes Division of the High 
Court of Uganda‟ available at http://www.jlos.go.ug/uploads/ICD_FAQs.pdf (accessed 
30 October 2011).   
46 See „Frequently Asked Questions on the International Crimes Division of the High 
Court of Uganda‟ available at http://www.jlos.go.ug/uploads/ICD_FAQs.pdf (accessed 
30 October 2011).   
47 See „Frequently Asked Questions on the International Crimes Division of the High 
Court of Uganda‟ available at http://www.jlos.go.ug/uploads/ICD_FAQs.pdf (accessed 
30 October 2011).   
48 See „Frequently Asked Questions on the International Crimes Division of the High 
Court of Uganda‟ available at http://www.jlos.go.ug/uploads/ICD_FAQs.pdf (accessed 
30 October 2011).   
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Court for interpretation which ruled in the accused favour and ordered his 
release.49 This decision may have a massive effect on other existing warrants 
for other ICC fugitives in Uganda who may also be entitled to amnesties.  
Similar proposals for the establishment of specialised hybrid domestic courts 
have been proposed for Burundi50 and Sudan.51 Other African countries such 
as Benin, CAR, Comoros, Republic of Congo, DRC, Nigeria, and Sierra 
Leone52 are also in various stages of concluding the domestication of the Rome 
                                                 
49 See Thomas Kwoyelo Alias Latoni v. Uganda Constitutional Petition No. 036/11in 
the Constitutional Court of Uganda.  
50 A UN Assessment Mission to Burundi recommended the establishment of a special 
chamber within the court system of Burundi. This recommendation was adopted by the 
UN Security Council via Resolution 1606. See also „UN mission recommends truth 
commission plus special chamber in Burundi's courts‟ available at 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=13784&Cr=burundi&Cr1= (accessed 
30 October 2011). 
51 The African Union High Level Panel on Darfur recommended the establishment of 
“…a Hybrid Court to deal particularly with the most serious crimes, to be constituted by 
Sudanese and non‐Sudanese judges.” See Report of the African Union High Level 
Panel on Darfur (AUPD) at XIX.    
52 See generally „Summary Chart on the Status of Ratification and Implementation of 
the Rome Statute and the Agreement on Privileges and Immunities (APIC)‟ available 
at http://www.iccnow.org/documents/Chart_Summary.pdf (accessed 30 October 2011). 
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Statute which will enable them to prosecute international crimes domestically 
and enhance the principle of complementarity.  
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2. CHAPTER TWO 
 
THE AFRICA POSITION ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
– FROM SYNTHESIS TO ARBITRAGE 
 
 
As has been noted in the forgoing Chapter, Africa has had a largely synthetic 
relationship with international criminal justice as has been noted from the role 
of the ad hoc Courts to the ICC. However, of late there has been a remarkable 
collective shift in that relationship. The following Chapter shall examine these 
changes.  
 
2.1. Initial Support for International Criminal Justice 
Individually and collectively African States have supported international criminal 
justice. African States with non-permanent seats at the Security Council have 
readily supported the establishment of ad hoc courts including the ICTR,53 
ICTY54 and SCSL.55 Further, following concerns over safety, access and 
facilities in Rwanda, Tanzania agreed to host the ICTR.56  
                                                 
53 Djibouti and Nigeria voted in favour of the establishment of the ICTR. See UN Doc 
S/PV.3453 (1994) 3.  
54 Cape Verde, Djibouti and Morocco voted for the establishment of the ICTY. See UN 
Doc S/PV.3217 (1993).  
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However, Africa‟s support for international criminal justice was signified in the 
push for the first permanent international criminal tribunal the ICC. This support 
was exemplified in a number of ways.  
 
2.1.1. Ratification of the Rome Statute 
The West African nation of Senegal was the first country to ratify the Rome 
Statute and to date, some 33 African States have signed up to the Treaty.57 A 
further five have fully domesticated the Rome Statute through implementing 
legislation,58 while 12 States have also signed the Agreement on the Privileges 
and Immunities of the Court.59  
                                                                                                                                              
55 Mali, Namibia and Tunisia voted in favour of UN Security Council Resolution 1315, 
UN Doc S/RES/1315 (2000) that led to the establishment of the SCSL. See UN Doc 
S/PV.3217 (2000).  
56 MØse E „The Main Achievements of the ICTR‟ (2005) Journal of International 
Criminal Justice 3 (4) 921.  
57 See „African States‟ available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/Menus/ASP/states+parties/African+States/ (accessed 30 October 2011). 
58 Namely Burkina Faso, Kenya, Senegal, South Africa and Uganda. See „Summary 
Chart on the Status of Ratification and Implementation of the Rome Statute and the 
Agreement on Privileges and Immunities (APIC)‟ available at 
http://www.iccnow.org/documents/Chart_Summary.pdf (accessed 30 October 2011). 
59 See „Ratification/Accession and Signature of the Agreement on the Privileges and 
Immunities of the Court (APIC) by region‟ available at 
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AU organs such as the African Commission on Human and Peoples‟ Rights 
(AComHPR) have also emphasised the need to ratify the Rome Statute. At its 
38th Ordinary Session held from 21 November to 5 December 2005, the 
Commission adopted resolution ACHPR/Res.87 (XXXVIII)05 urging AU 
Member States to ratify the Rome Statute.60 The AU also adopted universal 
ratification of the Rome Statute as part of its objectives under its 2004-2007 
Strategic Plan in line with an AU Assembly decision in January 2004.61   
 
2.1.2. Leadership  
Several Africans have also taken up senior positions at international courts and 
tribunals. Justice Richard Goldstone from South Africa had the onerous task of 
being the first joint Chief Prosecutor of the ICTR and ICTY between 1994 and 
1996.62  He has since been succeeded by Gambian national Hassan Jallow 
                                                                                                                                              
http://www.iccnow.org/documents/APIC_EN_chart_updated_October_2011.pdf 
(accessed 30 October 2011). 
60 See Resolution ACHPR/Res.87(XXXVIII)05  on Ending Impunity in Africa and on the 
Domestication and Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court.  
61 Statement by Mr. Ben Kioko, Legal Counsel of the African Union Commission on 
Behalf of the AU Commission at the Review Conference of the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) Kampala, Uganda 31 May-11 June, 2010 2.  
62 See „Justice Goldstone‟ available at 
http://www.un.org/News/dh/iraq/richard_goldstone.htm (accessed 30 October 2011). 
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who currently serves as the ICTR prosecutor and is assisted by South African 
national Bongani Majola.63  Adama Dieng an eminent international jurist from 
Senegal also serves as the current Registrar of the ICTR.64  
African leadership has also permeated the ICC. The current senior leadership 
at ICC organs include five African judges in chambers,65 the Deputy Prosecutor 
Ms. Fatou Bensouda (Gambia) and Head of the Jurisdiction, Complementarity 
and Cooperation Division Mr. Phakiso Mochochoko (Lesotho) in the Office of 
the Prosecutor.66 Mr. Didier Preira of Senegal also serves as the Deputy 
Registrar.67 Notably, following the end of the term of current Chief Prosecutor 
                                                 
63 See „Office of the Prosecution‟ available at 
http://www.unictr.org/tabid/104/default.aspx (accessed 30 October 2011). 
64 See „The Registry‟ available at http://www.unictr.org/tabid/105/default.aspx 
(accessed 30 October 2011). 
65 Judge Fatoumata Dembele Diarra (Mali) who is also the First Vice-President, Judge 
Akua Kuenyehia (Ghana), Judge Daniel David Ntanda Nsereko (Uganda), Judge 
Joyce Aluoch (Kenya) and Judge Sanji Mmasenono Monageng (Botswana). See 
generally „Chambers‟ available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Structure+of+the+Court/Chambers/ (accessed 30 October 2011). 
66 See „Office of the Prosecutor‟ http://www.icc-
cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Structure+of+the+Court/Office+of+the+Prosecutor/ (accessed 30 
October 2011). 
67 See „Mr Didier Preira newly elected Deputy Registrar of the International Criminal 
Court‟ available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/press%20releases%20(
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Louis Moreno Ocampo, it is widely tipped that Ms. Bensouda will succeed Mr. 
Ocampo as the next Chief Prosecutor of the Court after she was shortlisted for 
the position by the Assembly of States Parties (ASP) Search Committee and 
endorsed by the AU Executive Council as the sole African candidate for 
election to the position. 68 
 
2.1.3. Self Referrals  
Out of the seven situations before the ICC, those of CAR, DRC and Uganda 
made their way to the Court by way of self referrals even though the motives 
behind these referrals has been contested.69 The jurisdiction of the Court with 
respect to Sudan and Libya was triggered by a referral from the UNSC and the 
                                                                                                                                              
2008)/mr%20didier%20preira%20newly%20elected%20deputy%20registrar%20of%20
the%20international%20criminal%20court (accessed 30 October 2011). 
68 See Decision of the Executive Council on African Candidatures for Posts within the 
International System, Doc. Ex.Cl/673(XIX), Malabo 23 - 28 June 2011, 1(i), Report of 
the Search Committee for the Position of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal 
Court ASP/2011/117 and „ICC‟s Next Top Prosecutor: In the Bag – AU Endorses 
Bensouda for ICC Prosecutor‟ available at http://justiceinconflict.org/2011/09/02/iccs-
next-top-prosecutor-in-the-bag-au-endorses-bensouda-for-icc-prosecutor/ (accessed 
30 October 2011).  
69 See Akhavan P „Self-Referrals before the International Criminal Court: Are States 
the Villains or the Victims of Atrocities‟ (2010) Criminal Law Forum Volume 21 No. 1 
105.    
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situations in respect of Côte d‟Ivoire and Kenya were triggered by the 
Prosecutor‟s proprio motu powers.  
Notably, although the situation in Kenya was initiated by way of proprio motu 
powers, the Prosecutor‟s decision to commence an investigation was inevitably 
aroused and assisted to a great extent by the Kenyan government. After the 
Post Election Violence (PEV) in Kenya in 2007/2008 and the AU led mediation 
efforts that followed, the Commission of Inquiry on Post Election Violence 
(CIPEV) recommended the prosecution of persons bearing the greatest 
responsibility for crimes at a Special (domestic) Tribunal, failure to which a 
sealed list containing the names of suspects considered most culpable for the 
PEV would be handed over to the Chief Prosecutor of the ICC.70 Following the 
Kenyan government‟s failure to set up the Special Tribunal the AU mediator 
Koffi Annan delivered the sealed list which was subsequently followed up by a 
letter from the Kenya government in support of the prosecutions.71 These 
actions can easily be construed as forming part basis for a self referral.72  
 
                                                 
70 See „A Tribunal for Kenya: the Waki Commission Report‟ available at 
http://www.factsandarts.com/articles/a-tribunal-for-kenya-the-waki-commission-report/ 
(accessed 30 October 2011). 
71 See „How MPs rejected the proposed Special Tribunal for Kenya Bill‟ available at 
http://www.the-star.co.ke/weekend/siasa/17012-how-mps-rejected-the-proposed-
special-tribunal-for-kenya-bill- (accessed 30 October 2011). 
72 Akande D, du Plessis A & Jalloh C Position Paper – An African Expert Study on the 
African Union Concerns about Article 16 of the Rome Statute of the ICC (2010) 7.  
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2.1.4.  Recognising the Competence of the ICC 
Côte d‟Ivoire which was in late 2010 the scene of an outbreak of violence 
following the closely contested elections and the refusal of incumbent Laurent 
Gbabgo to step down from power could be another area of focus for the ICC. 
Although not a State Party to the Rome Statute, Côte d‟Ivoire recognised the 
Court‟s competence on its territory since 2003.73 On May 2011, 
President Ouattara wrote to the Prosecutor of the ICC requesting the 
Prosecutor to open an independent and impartial investigation into the crimes 
committed on Ivorian territory since 28 November 2010.74 Following a 
submission from the Prosecutor to initiate a proprio motu investigation, the Pre 
Trial Chamber on 3 October 2011 authorised his request to carry out 
investigations on alleged crimes committed on Ivorian territory since 28 
November 2010.75  
 
 
                                                 
73 See generally „Côte d'Ivoire‟ available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Structure+of+the+Court/Office+of+the+Prosecutor/Comm+and+Ref/
C%C3%B4te+dIvoire/ (accessed 30 October 2011). 
74 See generally „Côte d'Ivoire‟ available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Structure+of+the+Court/Office+of+the+Prosecutor/Comm+and+Ref/
C%C3%B4te+dIvoire/ (accessed 30 October 2011). 
75 Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorisation of an 
Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Côte d‟Ivoire ICC-02/11-14.   
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2.2. Emerging Tensions in the Administration of International 
Criminal Justice in Africa  
The long relationship between international criminal justice and African States 
has not been without its sour points. For example, Rwanda despite initially 
requesting the UN to set up a criminal tribunal after the 1994 genocide, voted 
against its establishment.76 Similarly, contrary to the majority of other African 
States, Libya refused to vote in favour of the establishment of the ICC.77 
Despite these actions these tensions have manifested themselves at the 
singular, state level with continued support for international justice at the 
continental level. 
Of late however, African States collectively and under the aegis of the AU have 
been especially critical about international criminal justice. The height of these 
tensions was reached in 2009 following the indictment of Sudanese President 
Omar al Bashir when some African States considered a mass pullout from the 
Rome Statute.78 In a series of AU Assembly decisions the AU has especially 
been vocal about the following five issues; the abuse of universal jurisdiction, 
                                                 
76 Akhavan P „The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: The Politics and 
Pragmatics of Punishment‟ (1996) American Journal of International Law Volume 90 
No. 3 5.  
77 Leigh M „The United States and the Statute of Rome‟ (2001) American Journal of 
International Law Volume 95 No. 1 124.  
78 See „African ICC Members Mull Withdrawal Over Bashir Indictment‟ available at 
http://www.voanews.com/english/news/a-13-2009-06-08-voa30-68788472.html 
(accessed 30 October 2011). 
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the role of the UNSC in the context of the Rome Statute, the misuse of 
discretionary prosecutorial powers, the immunities of heads of state and senior 
officials and sequencing of peace and justice, each of which shall be 
considered in detail below.    
 
2.2.1. The Abuse of the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction 
The principle of universal jurisdiction asserts that a court can assume 
jurisdiction for crimes despite the absence of traditional jurisdictional links with 
the accused or the acts.79 The prosecution of international crimes via universal 
jurisdiction has gained currency of late given the competing needs of balancing 
the prevalence of impunity and the limited capacity of international mechanisms 
to deal with large scale violations.80  
At the AU Assembly meeting in July 2008, the Union issued a series of 
decisions against what it termed the “…abuse and misuse of indictments 
against African leaders through the universality principle.”81 It noted that the 
                                                 
79 For a detailed discussion of the various perspectives of Universal Jurisdiction see 
Cassese A „When May Senior State Officials Be Tried for International Crimes? Some 
Comments on the Congo v. Belgium Case‟ (2002) European Journal of International 
Law Volume 13 No.4 855 – 862.  
80 Arimatsu L „Universal Jurisdiction for African Crimes? – Africa‟s hope for Justice.‟ 
(April 2010) Chatham House Briefing Paper IL BP 2010/01 3.  
81 Decision on the Report of the Commission on the Abuse of the Principle of Universal 
Jurisdiction Doc. Assembly/AU/14 (XI), Sharm El-Sheikh 30 June – 1 July 2008, 5(iii). 
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abuse of the principle would negatively impact on the political, social and 
economic development of African States and their ability to conduct 
international relations.82  The Union also took the decision not effect the 
warrants issued by courts, requested the AU Chairperson to meet with the 
European Union (EU) counterparts to discuss the matter with a view to finding 
a lasting solution.  
The matter was also brought to the EU level and discussed at the 10th AU-EU 
Ministerial Troika in Brussels in September 2008.83 Yet barely two months later, 
State Chief of Protocol to the President of Rwanda Mrs. Rose Kabuye was 
arrested in Germany at the request of a French judge. Following increased 
lamentations from the AU, Regional Economic Communities and Member 
States at the subsequent 11th AU-EU Ministerial Troika agreed to set up a 
technical ad hoc expert panel to clarify the issue and report back to the 
Troika.84 
                                                 
82 Decision on the Report of the Commission on the Abuse of the Principle of Universal 
Jurisdiction Doc. Assembly/AU/14 (XI) Assembly/AU/ Dec.199 (XI), Sharm El-Sheikh 
30 June – 1 July, 5(iii).  
83 See Communiqué of the Tenth Africa – EU Ministerial Troika Meeting Brussels, 16 
September 2008.  
84 Communiqué of the 11th AU-EU Ministerial Troika held on 20 & 21 November 2008, 
Addis Ababa, 12.  
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The technical ad hoc panel was composed of three eminent representatives 
from both the AU and EU sides.85 They were tasked to provide a description of 
the legal notion of the principle of universal jurisdiction, outline the respective 
understandings on the African and EU sides, and make appropriate 
recommendations to fostering a better mutual understanding and the practice 
of universal jurisdiction. 
The panel concluded their findings and clarified a number of important issues. 
First, the panel noted that positive international law recognised no mandatory 
hierarchy of internationally permissible jurisdictions.86 Essentially that a state 
which enjoys universal jurisdiction over international crimes is under no 
obligation to accord priority to the state of commission: in effect that the 
exercise of universal jurisdiction by European Courts in respect of crimes 
committed in Africa was valid. 
                                                 
85 The panel was composed of Dr Mohammed Bedjaoui (Algeria and former president 
of the International Court of Justice), Professor Chaloka Beyani (Zambia and UN 
Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons), Professor 
Chris Maina Peter (Tanzania and member of UN Committee on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination), Professor Antonio Cassese (Italy and former 
President of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon), Professor Pierre Klein (Belgium, 
Director of the Centre for International Law – University of Brussels) and Dr Roger 
O‟Keefe (Australia and Deputy Director, Lauterpacht Centre for International Law - 
University of Cambridge). Members of the group served in their individual capacity. 
86 The AU-EU Expert Report on the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction, Council of the 
European Union 8672/1/09 REV 1, 11.  
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The panel further noted that European Courts were not targeting African States 
as universal jurisdiction had only been applied by eight of the 27 EU counties 
with African personalities constituting less than one third of the total indictees. It 
also found that proceedings had been instituted against nationals of a variety of 
states, with African nationals, some 60 of them constituting slightly more than a 
third of the 26 states. The expert panel also stated that in exercise of universal 
jurisdiction, states must accord all relevant immunities to which foreign state 
officials and that states should refrain from prosecuting officials entitled to such 
immunities.87 
In order to prevent the breakdown of cordial relations the group also 
recommended according priority to territoriality as a basis of jurisdiction as 
serious crimes despite being offensive to the international community were 
primarily offensive to the state of commission. According preference to the 
state of commission would also assist in the collecting evidence and accessing 
witness thereby making the prosecutions easier.88  
They encouraged African states to adopt national, legislative and other 
measures aimed at preventing and punishing serious international crimes. To 
this end, they reinterred the AU Assembly‟s 2009 decision the recommended 
that the AU Commission consider the implications of the African Court on 
                                                 
87 The AU-EU Expert Report on the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction, Council of the 
European Union 8672/1/09 REV 1, 42.  
88 The AU-EU Expert Report on the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction, Council of the 
European Union 8672/1/09 REV 1, 42.  
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Human and Peoples‟ Rights being empowered to try serious international 
crimes.89  
 
2.2.2. The Role of the Security Council in the Context of the Rome 
Statute  
The AU has also taken issue over the manner and selectivity in which 
situations are referred and deferred to the ICC under Articles 13(b) and 16 of 
the Rome Statute respectively. This issue came to prominence following the 
referral of the situation in Darfur, Sudan to the ICC on the 31 March 2005 via 
UNSC Resolution 1593, and the subsequent decision by the ICC prosecutor to 
apply for the indictment of Sudanese President Omar Al Bashir.  
At the February 2009 AU Assembly meeting, the Union expressed its deep 
concern over the application for indictment of President Bashir, noting that in 
their view, the application would “…seriously undermine ongoing efforts aimed 
at facilitating the early resolution of the conflict in Darfur”, given the “delicate 
nature of the peace processes.” The Assembly went on to urge the UNSC to 
defer the proceedings and to request the AU Commission to send a high-level 
delegation to engage the UNSC.  
The Assembly then requested the AU Commission to convene a meeting of 
African States Parties to the Rome Statute with a view to exchanging views and 
adopting recommendations on the work of the ICC in Africa. It also endorsed 
                                                 
89 The AU-EU Expert Report on the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction, Council of the 
European Union 8672/1/09 REV 1, 41.  
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the decision of its Peace and Security Council to form a high level panel of 
eminent personalities to examine and recommend how accountability, impunity 
and reconciliation could be achieved in Darfur, Sudan. In the same vein it also 
requested the Commission to examine the implications of empowering the 
African Court to try international crimes.  
By the time the AU Assembly had met in July some six months later, the 
situation had gravely deteriorated. On 4 March 2009 Pre Trial Chamber I of the 
ICC had issued an indictment against President Bashir.90 Further, despite 
diplomatic support for the AU deferral proposal from the Non-Aligned 
Movement, the Organisation of Islamic Conference and the League of Arab 
States and from within the UNSC following support from China and Russia, the 
Security Council failed to meaningfully engage with the AU proposal.91 At the 
Assembly meeting, the AU went on to state that it: 
“[D]eeply regrets that the request by the African Union to the UN Security 
Council to defer the proceedings initiated against President Bashir of The 
Sudan in accordance with Article 16 of the Rome Statute of the ICC, has 
neither been heard nor acted upon, and in this regard, reiterates its request 
to the UN Security Council; 
                                                 
90 See „Darfur Sudan‟ available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Situations+and+Cases/Situations/Situation+ICC+0205/ (accessed 
30 October 2011).  
91 Akande D, du Plessis A & Jalloh C Position Paper – An African Expert Study on the 
African Union Concerns about Article 16 of the Rome Statute of the ICC (2010) 10.  
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Decides that in view of the fact that the request by the African Union has 
never been acted upon, the AU Member States shall not cooperate 
pursuant to the provisions of Article 98 of the Rome Statute of the ICC relating 
to immunities, for the arrest and surrender of President Omar El Bashir of The 
Sudan.”92 (Emphasis mine) 
 The above decisions clearly show that the main concern of the AU in respect 
of the work of the ICC has been the irresponsiveness of the UNSC with respect 
to its request for a deferral of the Darfur situation. It has been argued that 
failure of the UNSC to respond was caused by uncertainty as to how to deal 
with the AU request.93  However, this still does not explain why the UNSC has 
failed to debate the matter and come up with a common position to date, or 
even further why the Security Council has not responded to a further request 
for deferral submitted by Kenya and endorsed by the AU.94  
                                                 
92 Decision of the Meeting of African States Parties to the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, Doc Assembly/AU/13 (XIII), Sirte, 1–3 July 2009, 10.   
93 Akande D, du Plessis A & Jalloh C Position Paper – An African Expert Study on the 
African Union Concerns about Article 16 of the Rome Statute of the ICC (2010) 10.  
94 Decision on the Implementation of the Decisions on the International Criminal Court 
Doc. Ex.Cl/639(XVIII) Assembly/AU/ Dec.334 (XVI), Addis Ababa, 30-31 January 
2011, 6.   
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Resultantly, some African States and leaders have criticised the ICC for 
exclusively targeting Africans.95 These allegations are not fully accurate as has 
been shown above; all except two of the situations currently before the Court 
have received support by African States. In this sense it unfortunate and 
regrettable that such an attitude has been adopted.   
However, questions still remain over perceived selectivity of the UNSC. Some 
have queried why the UNSC had not referred international crimes that have 
take place in Georgia, Myanmar, Palestine and Syria. Others have also raised 
issue with the fact that three of the permanent five (P-5) members; China, 
Russia and the United States of America (USA) are not States Parties to the 
Rome Statute, and that on occasion, some of these states have even sought to 
undermine the Court. The USA for instance, in what was a legal first “unsigned” 
the Rome Statute. The USA also successfully bullied its way into obtaining a 
pre-emptive deferral immunising American peacekeepers in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina from the jurisdiction of the ICC after threatening to use its veto 
power to prevent a renewal of the mandate of the UNSC sanctioned United 
Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina.96 After her attempts to make the 
deferral permanent failed, the USA went on to conclude 102 Bilateral Immunity 
                                                 
95 See „ICC accused of „exclusively‟ targeting African‟ available at 
http://www.rnw.nl/international-justice/article/icc-accused-exclusively-targeting-africans 
(accessed 30 October 2011).  
96 Jain N „A Separate Law for Peacekeepers: The Clash between the Security Council 
and the International Criminal Court‟ (2005) The European Journal of International Law 
Volume 16 No.2 240.  
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Agreements preventing any possible assumption of jurisdiction over American 
citizens by the ICC.97  
The complexities around the role of the UNSC in the context of the Rome 
Statute are not novel. Even during the negotiations to conclude the Rome 
Statute, this proved one of the thorniest issues.98  
It is the author‟s view that there is still a strong need to maintain the role of the 
UNSC given its primacy over maintenance of international peace and security. 
However, it is unfortunate that the undemocratic nature and skewed balance of 
power at the UNSC has permeated its way into the work of the ICC and this in 
turn is raising concerns over the legitimacy of prosecutions at the Court.  It is 
also unfortunate that the UNSC seems to have abdicated from its duty to 
maintain peace in territories outside Africa.  
A short term solution to correcting this anomaly can be found in the AU 
proposal on amending Article 16 of the Rome Statute. Presented at the 8th 
Session of the ASP the proposal as presented reads: 
 
                                                 
97 See „Bilateral Immunity Agreements (BIA)‟ available at 
http://www.amicc.org/usinfo/administration_policy_BIAs.html (accessed 30 October 
2011).  
98 See Kirsch P & Holmes J „The Rome Conference on an International Criminal Court: 
The Negotiating Process‟ (1999) American Journal of International Law Volume 93 
No.1 4. See also Wippman D „The International Criminal Court‟ in Reus-Smit C (ed) 
The Politics of International Law (2006) 166.    
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Article 16: Deferral of Investigation or Prosecution 
No investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with under 
this Statute for a period of 12 months after the Security Council, in a resolution 
adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, has requested 
the Court to that effect; that request may be renewed by the Council under the 
same conditions. 
A State with jurisdiction over a situation before the Court may request the UN 
Security Council to defer a matter before the Court as provided for in (i) above. 
Where the UN Security Council fails to decide on the request by the state 
concerned within six (6) months of receipt of the request, the requesting 
Party may request the UN General Assembly to assume the Security 
Council’s responsibility under para. 1 consistent with Resolution 377(v) 
of the UN General Assembly.99 (Emphasis mine) 
 
The proposal intended to shift the power balance away from the UNSC to the 
UN General Assembly which is considered a more democratic institution. The 
proposal was not however considered in substance and has been relegated to 
the backburner till the next meeting of the Assembly of States Parties.100 
                                                 
99 Akande D, du Plessis A & Jalloh C Position Paper – An African Expert Study on the 
African Union Concerns about Article 16 of the Rome Statute of the ICC (2010) 12.  
100 See „ICC Assembly of States Parties Discusses Process for Amendments to the 
Rome Statute‟ available at http://iclferment.blogspot.com/2010/12/icc-assembly-of-
states-parties.html (accessed 30 October 2011).  
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2.2.3. The (Mis)use of Prosecutorial Discretion 
Another argument that has been levelled against the ICC in particular is 
(mis)use of prosecutorial discretion. The AU and proponents alike have argued 
that the ICC prosecutor seems to be misusing his discretion in targeting 
Africans to the exclusion of other nationalities. At the AU Assembly meeting in 
June 2009, the Assembly stated it:  
“[E]xpresses concern over the conduct of the ICC Prosecutor and 
Further decides that the preparatory meeting of African States Parties to the 
Rome Statute of the ICC scheduled for late 2009 should prepare, inter alia, 
guidelines and a code of conduct for exercise of discretionary powers by the 
ICC Prosecutor relating particularly to the powers of the prosecutor to initiate 
cases at his own discretion under Article 15 of the Rome Statute…” 
The above decision refers to Article 15(1) of the Rome Statute allows the 
Prosecutor to initiate investigations on the basis of his proprio motu powers. In 
determining whether to open an investigation the Prosecutor is governed by 
three criteria set out in Article 53 namely; whether the available information 
provides a reasonable basis to believe that a crime within the jurisdiction of the 
court has been or is being committed, whether the case would be admissible 
under Article 17 of the Rome Statute and finally whether it is in the „interests of 
justice‟ for the matter to be investigated.101 
                                                 
101 Article 53(1) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.  
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As has been mentioned earlier, of the current situations before the ICC only 
those of Côte d‟Ivoire  and Kenya have made their way to the Court through the 
exercise of the prosecutor‟s proprio motu powers and only after significant 
assistance by the two States. Thus, the Prosecutor cannot be said to have 
misused his discretion towards African States in this respect. However, what 
the Union is contending is that the Prosecutor has failed to use his discretion to 
suspend prosecutions in the interests of justice. Unfortunately as the AU 
concerns show, there is no set criteria as to what constitutes being in the 
“interests of justice.” The last section in this sub part shall also examine the 
varying dimensions to justice that may further complicate a decision to suspend 
a prosecution in the interests of justice.  
However, a different tangent to the AU argument is the concern that the 
Prosecutor has not applied his discretionary powers with respect to situations 
from outside Africa.  The AU Chairperson Jean Ping is quoted on record 
saying: 
"[W]e Africans and the African Union are not against the International Criminal 
Court. That should be clear…we are against Ocampo who is rendering justice 
with double standards…Why not Argentina, why not Myanmar ... why not 
Iraq?”102 
In response, the Prosecutor often asserts that preliminary investigations have 
been initiated in territories outside Africa such as Afghanistan, Colombia, 
                                                 
102 See „African Union Says Prosecutor is Biased‟ available at 
http://www.rnw.nl/international-justice/article/african-union-says-icc-prosecutor-biased 
(accessed 30 October 2011). 
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Georgia, Honduras, Iraq, Korea, Palestine, Republic and Venezuela.103 Whilst 
true, there seems to be lethargy on the part of the Prosecutor in respect to 
these territories. For example, the preliminary investigations in Afghanistan, 
Colombia, Honduras and Palestine have been under examination for several 
months and in some cases years.  This of course is not without reason: in the 
case of Afghanistan the Office of the Prosecutor has received little in the way of 
cooperation whilst in respect of Palestine, the office is said to be still making a 
determination on the issues.  
Yet, this does not explain how the Prosecutor has been able to move swiftly to 
turn preliminary investigations into situations or cases in respect of Côte 
d‟Ivoire and Kenya. The Prosecutor also proceeded with unprecedented speed 
in respect of the situation in Libya. Following the referral of the UNSC on 26 
February 2011, the Prosecutor announced the opening of an investigation five 
days later on 3 March 2011 and on 16 March 2011 submitted to Pre Trial 
Chamber I a request for arrest warrants.104  It took the Prosecutor a meagre 18 
days, barely three weeks to carry out a thorough investigation and to prepare a 
case even through there had being no cooperation from the Libyan 
                                                 
103 See „Communications, Referrals and Preliminary Examinations‟ available at 
http://www.icc-
cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Structure+of+the+Court/Office+of+the+Prosecutor/Comm+and+Ref/ 
(accessed 30 October 2011). 
104 Decision on the "Prosecutor's Application Pursuant to Article 58 as to Muammar 
Mohammed Abu Minyar Gaddafi, Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Alsenussi" ICC-
01/11-12.  
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government.105 It is therefore difficult to understand how situations from outside 
Africa have moved at snail‟s pace.  
 
2.2.4. The Immunities  of Heads of State and Senior Government 
Officials  
This question first come to the fore following the indictments of senior members 
of African governments under the principle of universal jurisdiction. At its 2008 
Half Summit, the AU Assembly observed that the “…abuse of the principle of 
universal jurisdiction…is a clear violation of the sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of these States.”106 Further, following the indictment of President 
Bashir the AU Assembly requested from the AU Commission in consultation 
with other African States Parties to the Rome Statute “…clarification on the 
Immunities of officials whose States are not party to the Statute.”107  
The AU therefore has raised two issues: whether state officials who enjoy 
immunity on the basis of official capacity can be prosecuted under the principle 
                                                 
105See „African Union: Members will not cooperate with Gadhafi warrant‟ available at 
http://articles.cnn.com/2011-07-03/world/libya.war_1_libyan-leader-moammar-gadhafi-
libyan-people-arrest-warrant?_s=PM:WORLD (accessed 30 October 2011). 
106 Decision on the Report of the Commission on the Abuse of the Principle of 
Universal Jurisdiction Doc. Assembly/Au/14 (XI) Assembly/AU/ Dec.199 (XI), Sharm 
El-Sheikh 30 June – 1 July 2008, 5(ii).  
107 Decision of the Meeting of African States Parties to the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, Doc Assembly/AU/13 (XIII), Sirte, 1–3 July 2009, 8(iv). 
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of universal jurisdiction and whether officials of non States Parties to the Rome 
Statute can be prosecuted by the ICC.  
The controversy around of immunities of senior government officials is not 
novel in international criminal law. Sovereign immunity was raised as a defence 
by several of the accused at the Nuremberg Trials who included senior 
government ministers and ambassadors. More recently international courts and 
tribunals such as the ICTY and SCSL have had to deal with the challenge of 
prosecuting individuals who enjoy sovereign immunity such as Slobodan 
Milosevic who was the head of the State of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
and Charles Taylor who was indicted when president of Liberia.  
The dilemma around immunities is further compounded by the competing 
norms of international law such as the established principle of sovereignty and 
newer principles such as international criminal law which prohibit the 
commission of international crimes.108 This tension is reflected in a joint reading 
of Articles 27 and 98(1) of the Rome Statute. Whilst Article 27 provides that 
neither official capacity nor immunities shall be a bar to the ICC from exercising 
jurisdiction, Article 98 directs the Court not to take action that would result in 
the violation by States of their international obligations to accord immunity to 
foreign officials.  There is also a level of uncertainty about immunities that arise 
on the basis of official capacity (ratione personae) and those that are granted 
on the basis of official acts (ratione materiae).  
                                                 
108 Simbeye Y Immunity and International Criminal Law (2004) 15.  
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To start with the latter issue, it can be generally agreed that immunities ratione 
materiae are not a bar to international criminal prosecutions for two reasons. 
First, it is a well established principle of international criminal law as derived 
through international custom from the Principles of Nuremburg that official 
capacity does not apply as a substantive defence in international crimes.109 
Further, the very nature of international crimes such as war crimes and 
specifically aggression are often committed in the context of official capacity as 
acts of state. Subsequently, the need to prosecute such abuses cannot 
logically co-exist with immunities ratione materiae.110  
The first issue as to whether state officials who enjoy immunity ratione 
personae are immune from prosecution for international crimes has been 
judicially settled by the International Court of Justice (ICJ). In the Arrest 
Warrant Case,111 a Belgian judge issued an international arrest warrant against 
the Congo Minister of Foreign Affairs for war crimes and crimes against 
humanity under the principle of universal jurisdiction. In its judgement, the ICJ 
observed:   
                                                 
109 See Boot M Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity, War Crimes: Nullum Crimen Sine 
Lege and the Subject Matter Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (2002) 
313.    
110 Akande D „International Law Immunities and the International Criminal Court‟ 
(2004) The American Journal of International Law Volume 98 No. 3 414.  
111 Arrest Warrant of April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), 
Judgment, I.C.J Reports 2002.   
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“…[i]t has been unable to deduce  . . . that there exists under customary 
international law any form of exception to the rule according immunity from 
criminal jurisdiction and inviolability to incumbent Ministers for Foreign Affairs, 
where they are suspected of having committed war crimes or crimes against 
humanity.”112 
The Court further clarified that immunities ratione personae are absolute and 
that any derogation from this principle was a violation of international law.113 
The respect for immunities is considered necessary to allow diplomats to 
exercise their functions and to prevent deterioration of international relations.114  
The decision of the ICJ in the Arrest Warrant Case also has ramifications on 
the second issue as to whether officials of non States Parties to the Rome 
Statute can be prosecuted. Despite the ICC being a treaty based body with 
obligations only accruing to member states, the ICC can be used to prosecute 
nationals from non States Parties. This flows from the provisions of Article 
13(b) of the Rome Statute allows the UNSC to refer a situation to the Court.  
This can include situations from states that are not party to the ICC for two 
interrelated reasons. The first being the primacy the UNSC has over the 
maintenance of international peace and security under Chapter VII of the UN 
                                                 
112 Arrest Warrant of April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), 
Judgment, I.C.J Reports 2002 58. 
113 Arrest Warrant of April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), 
Judgment, I.C.J Reports 2002 71.  
114 Akande D „International Law Immunities and the International Criminal Court‟ 
(2004) American Journal of International Law Volume 98 No. 3 410. 
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Charter.115  Thus the UNSC can, and should intervene where international 
peace and security are threatened. The second reason can be attributed to the 
near universal membership of the UN and the requirement that Member States 
respect the decisions of the UNSC.116 Therefore where the UNSC issues a 
resolution all UN Member States are bound to follow it. The ICJ also expressed 
itself on the matter when it observed:  
"[t]he immunities enjoyed under international law... do not represent a bar to 
criminal prosecution in certain circumstances.... [A]n incumbent or former 
Minister for Foreign Affairs may be subject to criminal proceedings before 
certain international criminal courts, where they have jurisdiction."117 
 
2.2.5. The Sequencing of Justice and Peace 
One of the most serious contentions against international criminal justice 
intervention in African is the view that it is seen as prejudicing attempts to 
secure lasting peace. The AU has specifically expressed its concerns on the 
timing of indictments by the ICC with respect to situations in Darfur, Kenya and 
Libya, which in the Union‟s view complicates efforts at reaching negotiated 
                                                 
115 Simbeye Y Immunity and International Criminal Law (2004) 15. See also Article 24 
of the Charter of the United Nations. 
116 See Article 25 of the Charter of the United Nations.  
117 Arrest Warrant of April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), 
Judgment, I.C.J Reports 2002 61.  
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political solutions to conflict, achieving peace building, national reconciliation 
and preventing the resumption of conflict.118  
It is worthy to note at this juncture that AU has not taken the view that peace 
and justice are mutually exclusive or that one should supersede the other.  
Conversely, in each of the AU‟s decisions requesting deferrals, the Union has 
also reiterated its desire to see accountability and an end to impunity in line 
with Article 4(h) of its Constitutive Act.  
Given current practice and the nature of the conflicts in Africa that have 
received attention of ICC, it can be deduced that the AU seems to favor an 
approach of sequencing the administration of justice to pursue peace. This 
concept can also be viewed from the two dimensions of justice in its retributive 
or restorative forms.  
Many scholars have argued that African cultures seem to favor a restorative 
justice approach119 which seeks to promote societal harmony through quasi-
judicial process of truth telling, acknowledgement, reparations, forgiveness, 
                                                 
118 See Decision on the Implementation of the Decisions on the International Criminal 
Court Doc. EX.CL/639(XVIII), Addis Ababa, 30-31 January 2011, 6 and Decision on 
the Implementation of the Assembly Decisions on the International Criminal Court Doc. 
Ex.Cl/670(XIX), Malabo, 30 June - 1 July 2011, 6. 
119 Nmehielle V The African Human Rights System – Its Laws, Practice and Institutions 
(2001)250.  
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healing and reconciliation as opposed to retributive justice which seeks to 
achieve prosecution and punishment.120  
Unfortunately, there are no clear (legal) guidelines on when or how to apply a 
sequenced approach. Within the context of the Rome Statute, sequencing can 
be achieved via Article 16 which provides for the power of the UNSC to defer a 
matter while through Article 53(2) (c) the Prosecutor may suspend prosecution 
when it is “…not in the interests of justice.” The challenges of requesting a 
deferral have already been discussed above while the latter provision is 
unfortunately vague.  
Current practice has showed that there are both benefits and drawbacks to 
employing a sequenced approach. In the case of Kenya where the AU 
brokered a political solution to the post election crisis in advance of punitive 
measures, this enabled the country to address the systemic causes of conflict 
and engage in necessary reforms which have included the passing of a 
progressive constitution that established and strengthened institutions to 
prevent  the resurgence of conflict.  
On the flipside as has also been witnessed Kenya, efforts to pursue 
prosecutorial justice and an end to impunity have been complicated by the 
reluctance of the state to investigate those most responsible for perpetrating 
                                                 
120 Murithi T „Sequencing the Administration of Justice to Enable the Pursuit of Peace: 
Can the ICC Play a Role in Complementing Restorative Justice?‟ IJR Policy Brief No. 
1, June 2010 1.  
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PEV. Often, negotiating peace may require the integration of perpetrators into 
government and the security forces or the issuance of amnesties all of which 
singularly or collectively may lead to complete inertia of the state in the pursuit 
of punitive justice.121  
Conversely, initiating retributive justice over peace can be beneficial. 
Prosecutions or the threat of prosecutions can assist in compelling parties to a 
conflict to negotiate peace. This has been evidenced in Uganda where ICC 
warrants for LRA leader Joseph Kony created additional incentives to reach a 
peace settlement.122 Preference of retributive justice models can also be 
beneficial where the state may not have the capacity or has failed to embrace a 
restorative justice approach. 
 An exclusive focus on retributive justice can however have unintended 
consequences. These have included the expelling of aid organisations in Darfur 
following the issuance of warrants of arrest for Sudanese President Bashir, the 
hardening of positions by parties to conflicts as has been witnessed in Libya 
which led to an escalation of violence and loss of life and the failure of Kenyan 
authorities to establish a comprehensive national accountability mechanism to 
try perpetrators of PEV.  
                                                 
121 Grono N & O‟Brien A „Justice in Conflict? The ICC and Peace Processes‟ in 
Waddell N & Clark P (eds) Courting Conflict? Justice, Peace and the ICC in Africa 
(2008) 13.  
122 Grono N & O‟Brien A „Justice in Conflict? The ICC and Peace Processes‟ in 
Waddell N & Clark P (eds) Courting Conflict? Justice, Peace and the ICC in Africa 
(2008) 15. 
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In summation, it must be observed that there are no set rules that determine 
when, how and in which order to choose a sequenced approach. Rather, a 
careful, balanced determination of all of the issues must be taken in order to 
ensure that the course of action chosen does not prejudice the need to achieve 
justice and lasting peace and reconciliation.123  
It is also imperative that the international justice actors give peace a chance. 
This should include on the basis of complementarity, according preference to 
prosecutions at the national level and where appropriate making use of 
traditional justice mechanisms.  
 
2.3. Concluding Remarks 
Africa‟s initial congenial relationship has steadily declined following both 
perceived and existing mistakes in the application of international criminal 
justice. It has been observed that with respect to the role of the UNSC, the 
application of universal jurisdiction and especially the sequencing of peace and 
justice, there is great need for clarification and further improvement in the 
application of these norms.  
In the same light, with respect to the immunities of heads of state and senior 
officials at the ICC, it appears from the research that the AU position is out of 
                                                 
123 Murithi T „Sequencing the Administration of Justice to Enable the Pursuit of Peace: 
Can the ICC Play a Role in Complementing Restorative Justice?‟ IJR Policy Brief No. 
1, June 2010 2.  
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step. The position of the AU not to cooperate with the ICC in this respect may 
be viewed as premature.  
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3. CHAPTER THREE 
3.  
CHARTING THE GENESIS AND EVOLUTION OF AN EMPOWERED 
AFRICAN COURT THROUGH THE AFRICAN UNION SYSTEM 
 
 
The OAU, the AU‟s predecessor faced numerous shortcomings in the 
prevention of conflict on the continent. Preventing conflict and strife was not a 
priority for the organisation and on most occasions the OAU found itself 
managing and resolving full blow conflicts as opposed to preventing them due 
to a lack of adequate structures and political will.  
This trend changed however with the rebirth of Africa‟s geopolitical body, and 
with it, a shift in focus on priorities. Spurred by the need to reform its response 
to numerous challenges including conflict, the Constitutive Act of the AU 
provided for a number of statutory safeguards to prevent and manage conflict. 
The most prominent feature of the Constitutive Act in this respect is Article 4(h) 
which provides for:  
“[T]he right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision 
of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, 
genocide and crimes against humanity as well as a serious threat to legitimate 
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order to restore peace and stability to the Member State of the Union upon the 
recommendation of the Peace and Security Council.”124 
 
The above provision not only allows the AU to intervene in the case of 
commission of serious international crimes, but also where the situation given 
its gravity warrants the intervention.125  
Article 4(h) is not just rhetoric, but is buttressed by the enforcement of 
economic or political sanctions in the case of non-compliance.126 Article 4(h) 
sanctions were applied in the case of Madagascar after Andry Rajoelina came 
to power in a popular coup.127 Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act is also 
credited as being the first to entrench the emerging Responsibility to Protect 
(RtoP) Norm to an international organisation.  
 
                                                 
124 Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union as amended by the Protocol 
creating the Peace and Security Council.  
125 Kioko B „The right of intervention under the African Union‟s Constitutive Act: From 
non-interference to non-intervention‟ (2003) International Review of the Red Cross 
Volume 85 No 852 815.  
126 See Article 23(2) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union.  
127 See „African Union Sanctions Madagascar's Leaders‟ available at 
http://www.voanews.com/english/news/africa/African-Union-Sanctions-Madagascars-
Leaders-88262607.html (accessed 30 October 2011).  
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3.1. Introduction to the AU’s Peace and Security Architecture and 
Dispute Resolution System  
The Constitutive Act which entered into force on 26 April 2001 reformed 
previous OAU institutions with a view to improving conflict prevention and 
management. For example, the Assembly of the Union has powers to “...give 
directives to the Executive Council on the management of conflicts, war and 
other emergency situations and the restoration of peace.”128 It can also 
suspend member states over non compliance with the Constitutive Act 
including over acts of unconstitutional changes of government.129 The 
Constitutive Act also created and empowered the Court of Justice of the Union 
as a new organ with a direct mandate over conflict prevention.130   
Yet despite this, it was felt that it was still necessary to give the AU real teeth to 
tackle conflict on the Continent. Coupled with the slow pace of implementation 
of the AU decisions, the Union began and is undergoing an internal set of 
changes to transform the AU to further devolve service delivery. Part of this 
transformative process includes transforming the AU Commission into the 
African Union Authority, developing an African Governance Architecture, Peace 
and Security Architecture and Human Rights System with the main aim of 
                                                 
128 See Article 9(1) (g) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union. 
129 See Article 23(2) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union.  
130 Created under article 5(1) (d) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union. 
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making holistic use of the structures, institutions and processes within the 
rubric of the AU to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts.131   
 
3.2. The AU Peace and Security Architecture  
The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) is one of the most 
relevant transformative processes as it constitutes the continents crisis 
management system. It was set in place following amendments to the 
Constitutive Act in 2002 creating the Union‟s Peace and Security Council which 
has a mandate over maintenance of regional peace and security. The APSA 
system is composed of five sub-structures namely; Peace and Security 
Council, the Continental Early Warning System, the Panel of the Wise, a Peace 
Fund and the African Stand-by Force.132 
The PSC was established in 2004 as a standing decision-making organ of the 
AU with competence over the prevention, management and resolution of 
conflicts. Feeding from the provisions of Article 4(h) the Peace and Security 
Council can recommend intervention to the Assembly in the case of 
international crimes. The PSC recognises the primacy of the UNSC but can 
                                                 
131 Powell K The African Unions Emerging Peace and Security Regime: Opportunities 
and Challenges for Delivering the Responsibility to Protect (2005) 1.  
132 Article 2(2) of the Protocol relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security 
Council.   
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also intervene on its own initiative as provided for under Chapter VIII of the UN 
Charter which recognises regional arrangements.133  
 
3.3. The Dispute Resolution System of the AU 
The AU currently has two dispute resolution bodies; the African Court of Justice 
(ACJ) and the African Court on Human and Peoples‟ Rights. The African Court 
of Justice, an organ of the Union is established by Article 5(1) (d) of the 
Constitutive Act of the African Union and has competence to interpret the 
Constitutive Act of the Union.134 The AfCHPR is an institution of the AU and is 
empowered to interpret the African Charter on Human and Peoples‟ Rights and 
complement the protection and promotion mandate of the African Commission 
on Human and Peoples‟ Rights (AComHPR).135  
In mid 2008, as part of a broader structural reform and in order to shelve 
ballooning institutional costs and duplicated mandates, African leaders voted to 
merge the two courts and establish the African Court of Justice and Human 
                                                 
133 See Article 52 of the Charter of the United Nations. The AU reiterated its ability to 
intervene in urgent situations. See The Common African Position on the Proposed 
Reform of the United Nations: “The Ezulwini Consensus” Addis Ababa, 7- 8 March 
2005, Ext/EX.CL/2 (VII) B(i).  
134 See Article 19(1) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union.  
135 See Article 3(1) of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples‟ 
Rights on the Establishment of the African Court on Human and Peoples‟ Rights.  
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Rights to serve as the main judicial organ of the AU.136 This process has in 
effect suspended the operalisation of the African Court of Justice whilst 
maintaining the current mandate of the AfCHPR.   Therefore, currently, the AU 
has only one functional court the AfCHPR, as the AU it awaits the completion of 
the merger process.  
The following part shall briefly consider the role and current work of the AU‟s 
only functional court as it is a precursor to a proposed empowered African court 
with an international criminal jurisdiction.  
 
3.3.1. The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
The AfCHPR is the apex body in the African Human Rights System.137 Prior to 
its establishment in 2004, it did not originally form part of the AU system under 
its new Constitutive Act. Promotion and protection of human rights pre 2004 
were the exclusive reserve of the African Commission on Human and Peoples‟ 
Rights.   
                                                 
136 See Article 2 of the Protocol to the Statute of the African Court of Justice and 
Human Rights.  
137 The African Human Rights System is composed of a combination of normative 
human rights instruments and institutional structures. For a further discussion see 
chapter 2 & 3 in Nmehielle V The African Human Rights System – Its Laws, Practice 
and Institutions (2001).  
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The Court which was established by way of a protocol to the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples‟ Rights in a move intended to add bite and complement to 
the protection and promotion work of the African Commission.138  
The Court is composed of 11 judges nominated from Member States of the AU 
and who serve in their individual capacity. The judges elect a President who 
with the assistance of the Vice President heads the Court. The Court also has a 
registry, headed by a registrar who assists the Court in its general and judicial 
functions. The Court is meets four times a year with each session lasting two 
weeks, however, the President of the Court serves on a full time basis.  The 
Court has its seat in Arusha, Tanzania.    
The AfCHPR has both contentious jurisdiction over human rights disputes and 
an advisory jurisdiction over the interpretation of any human rights 
instrument.139 The jurisdiction of the Court can be triggered by the AComHPR, 
States Parties and African Intergovernmental Organisations.  Citizens and non 
governmental organisations (NGOs) of States Parties may also submit cases 
before the Court if their respective State Party declaration allowing direct 
access to the Court.140  
                                                 
138 Article 2 of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples‟ Rights on 
the Establishment of the African Court on Human and Peoples‟ Rights. 
139 See Articles 3 &4 of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples‟ 
Rights on the Establishment of the African Court on Human and Peoples‟ Rights.  
140 See Articles 5 & 34(6) of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples‟ Rights on the Establishment of the African Court on Human and Peoples‟ 
Rights. 
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The Court has the power to issue binding judgements which include orders for 
appropriate remedies, payment of fair compensation or reparations. In cases of 
extreme gravity and urgency, and when necessary to avoid irreparable harm to 
persons, the Court can adopt provisional measures as it deems fit. 
Judgements of the Court are to be self executed by States Parties. However, 
implementation of the judgements is also monitored by the Executive Council.  
Currently, only 26 of the 53 member states of the AU are party to the Court. 
Further, only five states parties have issued a declaration allowing direct 
access to the Court.141 The low rate of ratification of the AfCHPR Protocol and 
the failure of States to issue declarations allowing direct access before the 
Court for individuals and NGOs has limited the Court‟s functionality. To date, 
the court has received only 12 cases and one application for an advisory 
opinion, of which four cases have been disposed of for want of jurisdiction.   
Despite the infancy of the AfCHPR, its intended role in preventing gross 
violations and the relationship between human rights and international criminal 
law has been evident. The first case before the Court, the Yogogombaye Case 
involved an application by Michelot Yogogombaye challenging the proposed 
prosecution by Senegal on behalf of AU of former Chadian President Hissene 
Habré. Yogogombaye alleged that the amendment of the Senegalese 
constitution to allow retroactive application of criminal law to solely prosecute 
                                                 
141 See See „List of countries which have signed, ratified/acceded to the Protocol on 
the African Charter on Human and Peoples‟ Rights on the Establishment of the African 
Court on Human and Peoples‟ Rights available at 
http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/992achpr.pdf  (accessed 30 October 2011). 
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Habré represented a violation of the sacrosanct principle of non-retroactivity of 
criminal law provided for in the Senegalese Constitution and Article 7(2) of the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples‟ Rights. Yogogombaye sought amongst 
others, orders stopping Senegal from prosecuting Habré and a declaration that 
Senegal was in violating the principle of universal jurisdiction.  
Although the case was not heard on merits for want of a declaration by Chad 
allowing direct access to the Court, it would have been interesting to see how 
the human rights Court would approach the issue of non-retroactivity of criminal 
law when compared against the need of prosecution of international crimes. 
The decision of the Court, if the case had proceeded to full trial, would also 
have reverberated across the AU because Senegal was requested to 
prosecute Habré by the AU on behalf of Africa.    
The Court‟s importance as part of the AU‟s Human Rights System was also 
observed in the ongoing case between the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples Rights and Libya.142  Filed on the 16 March 2011, the applicants the 
African Commission on Human and Peoples‟ Rights alleged that it received 
communications that the Libyan government used excessive force to suppress 
peaceful demonstrations in Benghazi and other Eastern cities in Libya in 
February 2011. The African Commission alleged that Libya was in violation of 
its human rights obligations under the African Charter and requested the Court 
to order Libya to set up an exhaustive inquiry and prosecute the perpetrators of 
                                                 
142 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights v. Great Socialist People's 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya AfCHPR Application No. 004/2011.  
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the violations and to amend its laws to be in line with current human rights 
norms.143  
In response to the African Commission‟s request the Court of its own motion 
issued provisional measures against Libya ordering to desist from the arbitrary 
use of force against its citizens.144  
The Court may also have a say in determining the rights of sentenced persons 
following the request by the Republic of Mali for an advisory opinion on issues 
concerning omissions in the agreement between Mali and the UN regarding the 
status of prisoners who have completed their prison terms following sentencing 
by the ICTR.145  
 
3.3.2. The African Court of Justice and Human Rights 
The new “merged Court” will retain the bulk of the features of both the ACJ and 
AfCHPR save for the fact that it shall have two sections; the general affairs 
                                                 
143 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights v. Great Socialist People's 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya AfCHPR Application No. 004/2011. 
144 See Order for Provisional Measures in the Matter of African Commission on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights v. Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya AfCHPR 
Application No. 004/2011.   
145 See „Request for Advisory Opinion from the Republic Of Mali‟ available at 
http://www.african-
court.org/fileadmin/documents/Court/Cases/casae_summaries/summary_of_request_f
or_advisory_opinion_for_the_website.pdf (accessed 30 October 2011). 
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section dealing with interpretation and application of the Constitutive Act and 
the human rights section devoted exclusively to human rights matters.146 The 
Protocol establishing the Court is now open for ratification although this is 
usually a lengthy process and the Court is not expected to become operational 
for a number of years.147  
 
3.4. Towards An African International Criminal Court 
As documented in Chapter Two, the genesis of an empowered court flows from 
the concerns that the AU has over international criminal justice as reflected in 
the decisions of the AU Assembly. To date, there have been three references 
to an empowered African Court. The first mention of the vesting the African 
Court with an international criminal jurisdiction was the Assembly‟s February 
2009 decision which was in response to the abuse of the principle of universal 
jurisdiction. The Assembly requested the AU Commission:   
“…[i]n consultation with the African Commission on Human and Peoples‟ 
Rights, and the African Court on Human and Peoples‟ Rights, to examine the 
implications of the Court being empowered to try international crimes such as 
genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.” 
                                                 
146 See Article 16 of the Protocol to the Statute of the African Court of Justice and 
Human Rights. 
147 Sceats S „Africa‟s New Human rights Court: Whistling in the Wind?‟Chatham House 
Briefing Paper IL BP 09/01, March 2009 2.  
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In a follow up to the above decision the July 2009 Assembly meeting requested 
the AU Commission to:  
“[I]n consultation with the African Commission on Human and Peoples‟ Rights 
and the African Court on Human and Peoples‟ Rights…examine the 
implications of the Court being empowered to try serious crimes of international 
concern such as genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, which 
would be complementary to national jurisdiction and processes for 
fighting impunity.” (Emphasis mine) 
 Subsequently at the Union‟s June/July 2011 Assembly meeting the AU 
Assembly requested the AU Commission to: 
“…[t]o actively pursue the implementation of the Assembly‟s Decisions on the 
African Court of Justice and Human and Peoples‟ Rights being empowered to 
try serious international crimes committed on African soil.” 
It will be noted that the first two decisions make reference to the human rights 
court while the June/ July 2011 decision refers to the merged court. It can be 
safely assumed that the first two references to the human rights court were in 
error as the court is largely transitional in nature and it would be logical that the 
AU chose to empower its main judicial with an international crimes mandate.  
However, further research shows that the AU may have, even before the 
February 2009 decision sought to create an empowered African court. The 
deepest insight is Article 25(5) of the African Charter on Democracy Election 
and Governance which provides: “[P]erpetrators of unconstitutional change of 
government may also be tried before the competent court of the Union.”  
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The language of the provision creates the following impressions; first, that the 
Union would recognise unconstitutional changes of government as a crime, and 
that individual criminal responsibility would extend to perpetrators of the crime. 
Second, that a “competent court of the Union” would try that crime. Obviously 
none of the existing courts of the Union in their current state has the 
competence to try crimes. It then must be taken that this provision was drafted 
in reference to an empowered court.  
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4. CHAPTER FOUR 
 
ANALYSIS OF THE RELEVANCE, VIABILITY AND POSSIBLE 
IMPLICATIONS OF AN AFRICAN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 
 
 
The AU Commission has initiated a process to extend the jurisdiction of the 
ACJHR through the development of a Draft Protocol. Although the Draft 
Protocol has not been released for circulation to the wider public as it is still 
undergoing internal validation, the following Chapter shall examine the process 
on the basis of existing information with a view to discussing its relevance, 
viability and implications for international criminal justice.  
 
4.1. Proposed Features of the Empowered Court 
4.1.1. Enabling Instrument 
The extension of the ACJHR jurisdiction will require a significant overhaul to its 
current legal framework. An additional protocol would be required to cater for 
the revised jurisdiction of the Court and the Rules and Procedure of evidence 
for criminal trials. Article 58 of the Protocol to the Statute of the ACJHR 
provides that an amendment to the Protocol may be by request of a State 
Party. However, in this case amendment has been initiated by the Assembly of 
Heads of State. 
The Draft Protocol is currently being considered by Member States, at the level 
of Government Experts. Thereafter the Draft will be considered by Justice 
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Ministers/ Attorney Generals before being submitted to the Executive Council 
and finally the AU summit for adoption148 
 
4.1.2. Structure and Composition  
The Draft Protocol if operationalised will add third international criminal law 
chamber to the ACJHR. It is proposed that the Court will be serviced by a pool 
of 16 judges, a Registry and the new organ of Office of the Prosecutor. The 
Draft Protocol also proposes a first instance division (pre-trial) and an appellate 
division.149 
 
4.1.3. Subject Matter Jurisdiction  
The main aim of the amendment procedure is to operationalise jurisdiction over 
core international crimes such as crimes against humanity, genocide and war 
crimes. However, it is also proposed that the Court adopt jurisdiction over the 
crimes of piracy, terrorism, mercenarism, trafficking drugs, persons and 
                                                 
148 See „The Role and Value Proposition of the Pan African Lawyers Union‟ available 
at http://www.aflsf.org/attachments/article/57/05.Elijah%20Banda%20(PALU)%20-
%20The%20Role%20and%20Value%20Proposition%20of%20PALU.pdf (accessed 30 
October 2011). 
149 See Background Document to the Third Roundtable available at 
http://www.icj.org/dwn/database/ACC%20DRAFT%20CONCEPT%20NOTE%20FOR_
MOMBASA%20ROUNDTABLE%20.pdf (accessed 30 October 2011). 
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hazardous wastes, international corruption and the new crime of 
unconstitutional change of government.150  
 
4.2. Analysis of the Relevance, Viability and Possible Implications of 
Empowering the African Court to Try International Crimes  
The creation of an African Court with an international criminal jurisdiction will be 
subject to both challenges and opportunities. Given the uniqueness of the 
proposal by the AU, there is a further need to examine the relevance, viability 
and implications of an empowered African Court. The following section shall 
examine three aspects namely creation of new regionalised international 
crimes, design and practical aspects and cooperation, complementarity and 
competition between the expanded African Court and the ICC.  
 
4.2.1. Creation of New Regionalised International Crimes 
International criminal law as a subset of international law has its sources under 
Article 38(1) of the Statute of the ICJ. These are: international instruments, 
judicial decisions and distinguished writings of eminent jurists, general 
                                                 
150 „EAC: Africa‟s new tool against war crimes‟ available at 
http://www.ippmedia.com/frontend/index.php?l=28654 (accessed 30 October 2011). 
See „The Scope for International Commercial Litigation and Arbitration in Regional 
Economic Community Courts in Africa‟ available at 
http://www.aflsf.org/attachments/article/57/04.D.DEYA-
The%20scope%20for%20international%20commercial%20litigation%20in%20REC%2
0Courts.pdf (accessed 30 October 2011). 
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principles of law and customary usage which can be drawn from policy 
statements and recitals in treaties.151 It is generally accepted that the three 
sources of international law are of equal value and that there is no hierarchy 
among them.152  
 
4.2.1.1. Conceptual Challenges 
In practise the creation of new international law is by treaty or by custom. Yet, 
while it may be relatively easy for the AU through treaty to create a Court with 
jurisdiction over existing crimes under international law, the inclusion of new 
international crimes such as international corruption may face structural and 
material challenges as the proposed new crimes may not have not crystallised 
into international legally binding norms.  
International law distinguishes between crimes under international law and 
other treaty-based crimes.153 Crimes under international law namely genocide, 
war crimes, crimes against humanity and aggression are composed of three 
distinct elements namely; they attract individual criminal responsibility, form 
part of a body of international law and are punishable directly under 
international law regardless of their incorporation under municipal law.154 The 
                                                 
151 Brownlie I Principles of Public International Law 7 ed (2008) 6.  
152 Schabas W An Introduction to the International Criminal Court 3 ed (2007)194.  
153 Werle G Principles Of International Criminal Law 2 ed (2009) 42.  
154 Werle G Principles Of International Criminal Law 2 ed (2009) 29.  
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distinguishing feature of crimes under international law vis-à-vis treaty-based 
crimes is their character of universality.155 The international dimension to 
crimes under international law arises because perpetration of these crimes runs 
counter to the fundamental values of the international community.156  Crimes 
under international law have risen to the level of peremptory norms (jus 
cogens) for which there can be no derogation.157  
Treaty-based crimes on the other hand attract punishment not directly from 
international law but from domestic implementing legislation. 158  
The mere act of creating an instrument and court which deals with “new 
international crimes” does not make them crimes under international law. While 
it may be accepted that some of the proposed crimes such as terrorism are 
offensive to the fundamental values of the international community and are thus 
evolving towards being crimes under international law, it cannot be said with 
certainty that these crimes have crystallised into peremptory norms of 
international law. The African Court may thus have to deal with similar 
challenges that were faced during the Nuremberg Trials where the accused 
challenged their prosecution on the basis of ex post facto law.159 
                                                 
155 Werle G Principles of International Criminal Law 2 ed (2009) 32.   
156 Werle G Principles of International Criminal Law 2 ed (2009) 33.  
157 Bassiouni C „International Crimes: "Jus Cogens" and "Obligatio Erga Omnes"‟ 
(1996) Law and Contemporary Problems Volume 59 No. 4 64.  
158 Werle G Principles of International Criminal Law 2 ed (2009) 42.  
159 Werle G Principles of International Criminal Law 2 ed (2009) 10.  
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A further challenge that will be faced in the creation of new international crimes 
will be the difficultly to conclude agreed definitions of the crimes. In the case of 
terrorism for example, the lack of a common definition has resulted in a 
“thematic approach” to the problem. This in turn has caused the codification of 
certain criminal acts to be deemed as terrorism for example hostage taking and 
hijackings.160  
While the AU can draw definitions for the proposed crimes from its existing 
body of treaty law, most of its instruments have adopted a thematic approach; 
defining acts that constitute crimes, but not comprehensively defining the crime 
itself.161 Adopting a thematic approach to crimes increases the risk of exclusion 
of certain acts as was illustrated following the need to expand the list of terrorist 
acts to include the financing of terrorism after the events of 11 September 
2001.  
However, the attempt to confer an international court with a broad mandate 
over new international crimes mandate is not unique. The International Law 
Commission‟s (ILC) Draft Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of 
Mankind of 1954 which formed part of the foundation of the works of the Rome 
Statute proposed the inclusion of mercenarism, albeit as part of aggression, as 
                                                 
160 Bantekas I & Nash S International Criminal Law 3 ed (2007) 196.  
161 See for example the definition of corruption in the Preamble to the African Union 
Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption.   
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a crime sanctionable under international law162  Further, a key moment in build-
up to the creation of the ICC was the request by Trinidad and Tobago to the UN 
General Assembly in 1989 to create a court to deal with drug trafficking and 
other transnational criminal activities.163  
The ILC which was tasked to work on the proposal of Trinidad and Tobago 
eventually developed the Draft Statute of the International Criminal Court of 
1994.164 The Draft Statute proposed the inclusion of “…exceptionally serious 
crimes of international concern.” 165 These crimes under the Draft Statute 
included acts of terrorism such seizure of aircraft, marine vessels and hostage 
taking while also including trafficking.166 The ILC‟s draft code of crimes against 
the peace and humanity of 1996 also proposed the inclusion of acts of 
terrorism as war crimes when committed in a conflict of a non international 
character.167     
                                                 
162 See Article 2 (4) of the Draft Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of 
Mankind of 1954.  
163 Arsanjani MH „The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court‟ (1999) 
American Journal of International Law, Volume 93 No. 1 24.  
164 Cassese A International Criminal Law 2 ed (2008) 328.  
165 Article 20 (e) of the Draft Statute of the International Criminal Court of 1994.  
166 See Articles 2, 6, 8 and 9 respectively of the Annex to the Draft Statute for an 
International Criminal Court of 1994.  
167 See Article 20(f) (iv) of the Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Humanity 
of 1996.  
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Others have argued that frequent use and reference to some if the proposed 
new crimes has led them to acquire customary status through state practise 
and opinio juris. Cassesse observes with respect to terrorism that the 
ratification of international instruments, the passing of UN General Assembly 
Resolutions and the decisions of various courts have all contributed to the 
crystallisation of the international crime of terrorism.168  
Recently, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) even though not an 
international court, handed down a decision in which it argued terrorism had 
become a crime under international law.169  
The same may hold for the crime of unconstitutional changes of government 
which seems to fulfil the three criteria for crimes under international law.  
The African Charter on Democracy Elections and Governance is an 
international instrument that sets outs rights and obligations for its States 
Parties. Article 25(5) of the Charter states: “[P]erpetrators of unconstitutional 
change of government may also be tried before the competent court of the 
Union.” Article 25(7) goes on to provide that the AU Assembly may apply 
sanctions to perpetrators including punitive measures. Article 25(8) further 
requires States Parties not to harbour or give sanctuary to perpetrators of 
unconstitutional changes of government while article 25(9) requires states to 
                                                 
168 Cassese A International Criminal Law 2 ed (2008)163.  
169 See Ambos K „Judicial Creativity at the Special Tribunal for Lebanon: Is There a 
Crime of Terrorism under International Law? ‟ (2011) Leiden Journal of International 
Law Volume 24 No. 3 665- 675.  
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“…bring to justice the perpetrators of unconstitutional changes of government 
or take necessary steps to effect their extradition”170 
The above provisions of the Charter clearly establish individual criminal 
responsibility for the crime of unconstitutional changes of government by its 
reference to trials and punitive sanctions for perpetrators. The Charter also 
enables the African Court to prosecute the perpetrators directly whilst creating 
a „prosecute or extradite‟ rule for States Parties.  
 
4.2.1.2. Jurisdiction Over the Crime of Aggression? 
It is unclear at this stage whether the expanded Court will be given jurisdiction 
over the crime of aggression especially given its political overtones. However, 
may it is safe to assume that most States will be in favour of this proposal given 
their previous support as part of the “Like-Minded Group” which was in favour 
of giving the ICC jurisdiction over the crime of aggression during the drafting 
process of the Rome Statute.171 The AU and a number of African States were 
also in favour of gradually operationalising the jurisdiction of the ICC over the 
crime of aggression at the Rome Statute Review Conference.172 The recent 
                                                 
170 Article 25(9) of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance.  
171 Leonard KE The Onset of Global Governance: International Relations Theory And 
the International Criminal Court (2005) 92. 
172 Statement by Mr. Ben Kioko, Legal Counsel of the African Union Commission on 
Behalf of the AU Commission at the Review Conference of the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) Kampala, Uganda 31 May-11 June, 2010 5. 
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events of the Arab Spring/Uprisings specifically the alleged aggression by 
NATO forces in Libya may also tilt the scale in favour of prosecuting 
aggression.  
Should the drafters choose to include the crime of aggression, they may be 
guided by the AU‟s definition of the crime of aggression which is contained in 
the Union‟s Non-Aggression and Common Defense Pact which in many 
respects resembles the Kampala Consensus.173  
 
4.2.1.3. Necessity for Jurisdiction of New International Crimes 
There may be justification in expanding the African Courts jurisdiction over 
some new crimes especially given the current challenges being faced by the 
region. Research by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) shows that 
maritime piracy activities off the coast of Somalia are escalating to dangerously 
high levels. Between January and March 2011 alone, 33 vessels had been 
seized, 711 hostages held seven fatalities incurred.174 In 2010 it was estimated 
that between US$ 180 – 238 million were paid out in ransoms.175 The global 
ramifications of piracy activity are estimated to cost between US$ 7-12 billion 
per annum. The seriousness of the matter and its relevance to international 
                                                 
173 See Article 1(c) of the African Union Non-Aggression and Common Defense Pact.  
174 FAFT Report - Organised Maritime Piracy and Related Kidnapping for Ransom 
(2011) 6.  
175 FAFT Report - Organised Maritime Piracy and Related Kidnapping for Ransom 
(2011) 6. 
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peace and security was evidenced when it was seized upon by the UNSC as 
evidenced by Resolution 1918 (2010).  
In response to this problem, several jurisdictions have attempted to bring about 
prosecutions of pirates most notably Kenya. However, the Kenyan judicial 
system has been overwhelmed by the sheer number of accused176 and is also 
viewed as ill equipped to deal with the complexity of the trials especially on 
jurisdictional issues and intricate matters of international maritime law.177 This 
has led some to float the idea of the prosecution of pirates at the International 
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea in Hamburg or at an extraterritorial court in 
Arusha that would make use of the facilities of the wound up ICTR.178  
Due to its proximity to the crimes, evidence and witnesses and its ability to 
provide an appropriate forum for prosecution of other pirate attacks across 
Africa, it is submitted that an African Court with an international criminal 
jurisdiction could be a useful tool in the prosecution of piracy. This matter may 
                                                 
176 Since 2008, more than 2000 suspects have been detained over suspicion of piracy 
while currently over 100 are awaiting trial in Kenya. See Pemberton B „The 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea as a High Court of Piracy‟ One Earth 
Future Foundation Working Paper (2010) 9  and Mwangi W „Developments in 
international criminal justice in Africa during 2010‟ (2011) African Human Rights Law 
Journal Volume 11 No. 1 278.  
177 Pemberton B „The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea as a High Court of 
Piracy‟ One Earth Future Foundation Working Paper (2010) 12.  
178 Mwangi W „Developments in international criminal justice in Africa during 2010‟ 
(2011) African Human Rights Law Journal Volume 11 No. 1 276.  
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also draw the support following the UN Secretary General‟s Report to the 
UNSC on the matter which proposed the establishment of an international or 
regional tribunal to deal with maritime of piracy.179   
 
4.2.2. Design and Practical Aspects  
The creation of a new international criminal jurisdiction for the African Court 
faces overwhelming design and practical challenges. The two most prominent 
of these challenges are resource constraints and practical and technical 
difficulties that will be faced.  
 
4.2.2.1. Resourcing the Empowered African Court: Finances  
International criminal law practise is an expensive endeavour given nature of 
the crimes being prosecuted and the high standards required to sustain fair 
trials. To illustrate, the 2011 budget of the ICC was € 103,607,900180 while the 
budget of the ICTR for the period 2010- 2011 was US$245,295,800.181 To date, 
the ICTR and ICTY have each spent over US$ one billion and the ICC more 
                                                 
179 See Report of the Secretary-General UN Doc S/2010/394 4.  
180 See Resolution ICC-ASP/9/Res. of the Assembly of States Parties Adopted at the 
5th plenary meeting, on 10 December 2010, by consensus.  
181 See „General Information‟ available at  
http://unictr.org/AboutICTR/GeneralInformation/tabid/101/Default.aspx (accessed 30 
October 2011). 
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slightly more than half a billion Euros.182 To put that in perspective, the current 
budget of the AfCHPR is US$ 6,478,071 while the current budget of the AU for 
the year financial 2011 was pegged at US$ 256,754,447.183  
This indicates that the sheer scale of resources required to finance the 
international criminal trials will require an exponential increase in current 
budgetary support for the African Court from the AU.  
Insufficient funding can hinder and affect the hiring of competent staff, the 
carrying out of effective investigations, raise challenges of inequality of arms, 
legal aid, prevent victim and witness participation and hinder witness 
protection. The funding challenge is may also lead to questions over the 
legitimacy of the proceedings themselves as was witnessed with the SCSL. It 
has been argued that the shoestring budget given to the SCSL affected the 
number of indictees the prosecutor brought, the SCSL‟s outreach activities and 
equality of arms.184  
The funding challenge will not be unique to Africa as even supranational courts 
like the ICC are facing serious financial problems. In 2011 the ASP against the 
recommendations of the Committee on Budget and Finance approved a “zero 
                                                 
182 Wippman D „The Costs if International Justice‟ American Journal of International 
law (2006) Volume 100 No. 4 861.  
183 See Decision on the Budget for the African Union for the 2011 Financial Year - Doc. 
EX.CL/622(XVIII), Addis Ababa, 24 - 28 January 2011, 2.  
184 Jalloh C „Special Court for Sierra Leone – Achieving Justice?‟ (2010) Legal Studies 
Research Paper Series Working Paper No. 2010-31 428 and 441.  
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growth” budget by retaining the same budgetary amount that was accorded to 
the Court in 2010.185  
Another challenge is that international criminal law is a reactive and evolving 
field of international law. Many of the requirements and standards of 
international criminal law that are currently in place may be expanded or 
replaced by others therefore requiring increased resources to sustain them. For 
example, the introduction of formal legal representatives for victims and 
witnesses is a creation that did not exist at the formation of the ad hoc courts 
but has since been enshrined in the Rome Statute. Similarly, the provision by 
the Lebanon Tribunal of an independent organ for the defence might have an 
impact on how future courts and tribunals are structured.186  
The planners behind an empowered African Court must keep in mind such 
developments and the general trend toward escalating costs of trials.  
 
4.2.2.2. Resourcing the Empowered African Court: Human Capital  
Creating an international criminal mandate for the African Court over and above 
its current structure will necessitate the appointment and recruitment of judges, 
prosecutors, investigators, additional legal staff, registry officers, translators, 
                                                 
185 See „Press Release by the Coalition for an International Criminal Court “Global 
Coalition Calls on States to Maintain Financial Commitment To The ICC” available at 
http://www.iccnow.org/documents/CICC_PR_Budget_FINAL_08072011_(1).pdf 
(accessed 30 October 2011). 
186 See Article 7(d) of the Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon.  
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interpreters and countless other professionals.  This staff outlay could run well 
into the hundreds. To illustrate, the ICTR currently employs some 628 
individuals.187 
The cost of recruitment and retention of competent and highly skilled staff is 
usually high. At the same time, the AU will be competing with other 
international organisations for the same talent. The AfCHPR has acknowledged 
that human capital component is currently insufficient and that there is “…an 
acute shortage of staff for the effective functioning of the Court.”188  
 
4.2.2.3. Amendment Procedure 
As was observed in the Chapter above, the activation of criminal jurisdiction of 
the African Court would be by way of amendment of the current Protocol on the 
Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights. For the amending 
protocol to come into force, it will need to be ratified by States Parties. Current 
AU practise requires 15 ratifications before the entry into force of a treaty. This 
                                                 
187 See „General Information‟ available at 
http://unictr.org/AboutICTR/GeneralInformation/tabid/101/Default.aspx (accessed 30 
October 2011). 
188 Presentation by Honorable Justice Augustino S.L. Ramadhani on Opportunities and 
Challenges for the African Court On Human And Peoples‟ Rights during the Third 
Meeting of Legal Advisors of the African Union and the Regional Economic 
Communities, 11-13 July 2011.   
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presents a significant challenge within the membership of the AU as ratification 
practise is very poor.  
To illustrate, despite the adoption of the ACJHR Protocol at the AU Assembly 
on July 2008, there have only been three ratifications of the ACJHR Protocol to 
date.189 In the case of the AfCHPR it took five years to receive the 15 
ratifications necessary to operationalise the Court.190  
Even in respect to some of the novel crimes that the AU is proposing, support 
for the relevant instruments is still low. The African Charter on Democracy 
Elections and Governance which creates the crime of unconstitutional changes 
of government has received 10 ratifications191 while the Protocol to the OAU 
Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism which gives the 
                                                 
189 See „List of countries which have signed, ratified/acceded to the Protocol on the 
Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights‟ available at 
http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/9999Protocol_on_Statute_of_the_African_Court
_of_Justice_and_HR.pdf (accessed 30 October 2011). 
190 See „List of countries which have signed, ratified/acceded to the Protocol to the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples‟ Rights on the Establishment of an African 
Court on Human and Peoples‟ Rights‟ 
http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/992achpr.pdf available at (accessed 30 October 
2011). 
191 See „List of countries which have signed, ratified/acceded to the African Charter on 
Democracy, Elections and Governance‟ available at 
http://au.int/en/sites/default/files/Charter_on_Democracy_and_Governance.pdf 
(accessed 30 October 2011). 
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PSC primacy over dealing with terrorism in Africa has received 12 
ratifications.192  
Thus even if the AU were to proceed with creating an empowered African 
Court, it would require improved ratification standards, not just for the protocol 
to expand the Court‟s jurisdiction, but also for the existing corpus of AU law.  
 
4.2.2.4. Diplomatic Aspects and Political Will 
There will also need to be sufficient political and diplomatic resolve required in 
finding a permanent residence for the empowered African Court.  
As has been illustrated above, the seat of the current African Court on Human 
and Peoples‟ Rights is Arusha, Tanzania. The AU also saw it fit to host the 
ACJHR in the same city in an effort to ease the transition to a merged court.193  
Although Arusha is aptly styled as the “Geneva of Africa” hosting international 
institutions such as the ICTR, the East African Community and the East African 
Court of Justice, the AfCHPR has struggled to find a permanent home in the 
city. Tanzania agreed to host the Court and entered into a host agreement with 
                                                 
192 See „List of countries which have signed, ratified/acceded to the Protocol to the 
OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism‟ available at 
http://au.int/en/sites/default/files/Protocol_on_Terrorism.pdf (accessed 30 October 
2011). 
193 Article 25(1) of the Protocol on the Statute to the African Court of Justice and 
Human Rights provides that the seat of the Court “…shall be same as the Seat of the 
African Court on Human and Peoples‟ Rights.”   
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the Court in 2007. Under the terms of the agreement the government of 
Tanzania would to provide working premises for the Court. Yet for the past five 
years progress on finding a permanent residence for the Court has been slow 
as it is currently temporarily housed at a government property as it awaits 
construction of permanent premises.194    
The Court would also require diplomatic support to conclude detention 
agreements for the accused after they have served their sentences, and 
asylum agreements for the acquitted who may not be able to return to their 
state of origin. This has been major challenge for existing courts such as the 
ICTR.195  
However by far, the political will to respect and enforce the decisions of an 
empowered African court will be its greatest test. Judging from current practise, 
full state compliance with decisions of the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples‟ Rights lies at an appalling 14%.196 The lack of political will in 
complying with decisions of regional courts is Africa is also very low. After 
passing a series of critical decisions against Zimbabwe, the Southern African 
                                                 
194 See „Institutional Background‟ available at http://www.african-
court.org/en/court/about-the-court/institutional-background/ (accessed 30 October 
2011). 
195 See Heller KJ „What Happens to the Acquitted?‟ (2008) Leiden Journal of 
International Law Volume 21 No. 3 665- 674.   
196 Louw L „An Analysis of State Compliance with the Recommendations of the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples‟ Rights‟ (2005) Unpublished LL.D Dissertation 
University of Pretoria iv.  
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Development Community (SADC) Tribunal‟s jurisdiction was frozen at the 
request of Zimbabwe and the Tribunal was disbanded indefinitely by the SADC 
Summit of Heads of State.197 The East African Court of Justice also suffered a 
similar fate after it issued several taught decisions against the Kenyan 
government. Judges were recalled, the composition of the court was reshuffled 
and its rules of procedure amendment to limit as much as possible litigation by 
citizens against the state.  
Political resolve is also required to adequately fund the Court. Current funding 
practise within the AU and its membership in this respect is wanting. To 
illustrate, after requesting Senegal to prosecute former Chadian President 
Habré on behalf of Africa, the AU then faced funding difficulties in meeting the 
proposed budget of the trial which has meant Habré has still not been tried 
since 2006.198 It is also difficult to explain why the AU chose to reduce the 
budget of the AfCHPR from US$ 7,939,375 in 2010 to US$ 6,478,071 in 2011 
at a time when the Court is required to scale up its operations.  
African States would need to prove and improve their commitment to complying 
with current mechanisms otherwise expanding the African Court‟s jurisdiction 
may be a worthless exercise.  
 
                                                 
197 See „SADC Tribunal Suspended for a Further Year‟ available at 
http://allafrica.com/stories/201105230449.html (accessed 30 October 2011). 
198 Decision on the Hissene Habré Case Doc. Assembly/AU/9(XVI), Addis Ababa, 31 
January – 2 February 2010, 3.  
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4.2.3. Cooperation, Complementarity and Competition Between the  
Empowered African Court and the National and International 
Courts  
The most significant test for the African Court will be how it fits into the 
international criminal justice system. With respect to national jurisdictions, the 
decision of the AU assembly in 2009 stated that the Courts criminal jurisdiction 
would be complementary to that of national courts.199 This matter is fairly 
straight forward as it would, as is currently the case with the ICC, allow national 
courts to first assume jurisdiction over crimes. This would then require states 
parties to incorporate within their domestic jurisdiction laws providing for the 
prosecution of all new crimes under the empowered court. The real challenge 
for the court however will be at the international level.  
As has been observed above, the genesis of the creation of an empowered 
African Court has much to do with the tensions that exist between the AU and 
the ICC. Some analysts have therefore concluded that the AU is creating an 
empowered African court as parallel process to the ICC in Africa. Others have 
argued that once the African Court is empowered with an international crimes 
mandate, this may signal a mass exodus from the Rome Statute by African 
States.200 
                                                 
199 Decision of the Meeting of African States Parties to the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, Doc Assembly/AU/13 (XIII), Sirte, 1–3 July 2009, 5.  
200 See „Africa Plots Mass Walk Out from ICC‟ 
http://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2011/03/africa-plots-mass-walkout-from-icc/ 
(accessed 30 October 2011). 
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Whilst there is circumstantial evidence in support of the above arguments, the 
veracity of these claims cannot be empirically ascertained. The AU in its official 
communications has maintained a more tempered and nuanced approach to 
the problem reiterating its concerns about the ICC while maintaining its resolve 
to fight impunity. The AU‟s continued focus on the ICC has been signalled by 
its support for African candidatures for the positions of Chief Prosecutor and 
judge. The AU in July 2011 also held a joint seminar with the ICC which 
intended to discuss amongst others, “…developing a permanent system of 
exchange and communication between the ICC and the African Union.”201 This 
could signal a softening of the AU‟s July 2010 decision denying the request of 
the ICC to open up a Liaison Office at the AU Commission.202   
Notwithstanding, even if African states choose to walk out of the ICC, this will 
not serve to alleviate the bulk of their existing concerns. As members of the 
UN, African States will still be subject to the selectivity of UN Security Council. 
                                                 
201 See Concept Paper ICC – AU Joint Seminar on the technical aspects of the Rome 
Statute in Addis Ababa available at 
http://www.au.int/en/dp/legal/sites/default/files/Joint_seminar_ICC_AU_Concept_paper
_clean_version_-_Final[1]_1.pdf (accessed 30 October 2011).  
202 Decision on the Progress Report of the Commission on the Implementation of 
Decision Assembly/AU/Dec.270 (XIV) on the Second Ministerial Meeting on the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) Doc. Assembly/AU/10(XV) Kampala, 
25 – 27 July 2010, 8.  
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A mass walk out of the ICC will also not serve to halt existing trials or 
indictments by the Court.203  
If the AU chooses to empower the African Court‟s mandate whilst maintaining 
its current support for the ICC, this may give rise to concurrent or overlapping 
jurisdiction between the courts. It is therefore possible that the two courts may 
compete to investigate and prosecute crimes which may give rise to duplicity of 
work, wastage of resources and divergent jurisprudence.  
It is also possible that the two courts may investigate or prosecute the same 
individuals on the basis of the same facts but in relation to different crimes. This 
can arise for example where one court investigates the crime of murder as 
genocide and the other the crime of murder but as a crime against humanity.  
This, apart from raising practical challenges such as securing the presence of 
the accused before the respective courts may also lead to a breach of the ne 
bis in idem principle therefore leading to double jeopardy.204     
 
4.2.3.1. The Argument for Regional Complementarity  
On the other hand, a strong argument can be made for supporting overlapping 
jurisdiction between the AU Court and the ICC in a form of „regional 
complementarity.‟ The ICC‟s role as a Court of last resort has meant that it 
applies a high threshold when deciding whether to prosecute crimes. This 
threshold requirement is provided for under Article 17(d) of the Rome Statute 
                                                 
203 See Article 127(2) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.  
204 Werle G Principles Of International Criminal Law 2 ed (2009) 248.  
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which requires the crimes under the jurisdiction of the Court to be of significant 
gravity. The decision of the ICC not to prosecute on the basis of this threshold 
requirement should not be viewed as implying that those acts did not constitute 
international crimes per se, but rather that they did not meet the Court‟s 
jurisdictional requirement of prosecuting the most serious crimes of 
international concern.205  
Where the ICC may choose or in fact be unable to prosecute on the basis of 
this threshold standard, the African Court should, as a regional complement 
have the option to intervene on the basis of its „concurrent‟ jurisdiction over 
certain crimes but at a lower threshold.  
The argument for regional complementarity is also bolstered by the fact that 
despite Africa‟s claim to be the largest regional bloc to the Rome Statute, 25 
African States are still not party to the Court due to political and other factual 
constraints. Non states parties to the Rome Statute in Africa include Zimbabwe, 
Sudan and Somalia States which have all seen or are still facing situations of 
gross human rights violations. The inability of the ICC to act in these situations 
coupled with the unlikelihood of prosecutions at the domestic level may mean 
victims of grave violations may not receive justice.  
An empowered African Court which would apply territorial jurisdiction over the 
entire Africa could serve to prosecute perpetrators of crimes in these countries. 
                                                 
205 See generally the Dissenting Opinion by Judge Hans-Peter Kaul to Pre-Trial 
Chamber II's "Decision on the Prosecutor's Application for Summons to Appear for 
William Samoei Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua Arap Sang" ICC-01/09-
01/11.  
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It would do so on a Continent where the need for further prosecution of 
international crimes is necessary and without some of the challenges facing 
other international courts such as proximity to evidence, victims and witnesses, 
thereby reducing the cost of international trials.  In addition, the possible 
presence of two courts that could assume jurisdiction over perpetrators of 
crimes in these and other countries may have an increased deterrent effect.  
The broader range of new crimes proposed for the African Court and their 
relevance to the core crimes of international law under consideration by the 
ICC can lead to the casting of a wider net against impunity. Unconstitutional 
changes of government which have occurred in Côte d‟Ivoire for example have 
also given rise to the commission of other crimes under international law. 
Transitioning states may choose make use of both courts to achieve justice for 
interrelated crimes under such situations.  
As has been illustrated above, the creation of an African international criminal 
court need not prejudice the work of the ICC. Rather, the two courts‟ can work 
hand in hand in a regionally complementary manner to achieve justice for 
victims and an end to impunity. It may therefore be necessary for the AU and 
ICC to consider how both courts could cooperate and collaborate in the sharing 
of materials, evidence, jurisprudence, staff and even in the transfer of suspects 
between the courts.    
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4.3. Concluding Observations 
The preceding part has clearly showed that are both firm prospects and 
challenges for an empowered African Court.  
Whilst the empowered African Court will have the ability to prosecute a broader 
range of crimes in closer proximity to conflict situations and have an increased 
the deterrent effect, the challenge of its funding and political will remain serious 
obstacles to be overcome.  
It has also been pointed out that there is space for both the African Court and 
ICC to function in a mutually beneficial manner. However, the challenge of 
concurrent on overlapping jurisdictions may require the African Court to serve 
as „regional complement‟ to the existing jurisdiction of the ICC recognising it as 
the apex court in the international criminal justice system. The development this 
form of regional complementarity would also be in line with Chapter VIII of the 
UN Charter which provides for regional arrangements for the maintenance of 
international peace and security.206 It is also for this reason the AU membership 
should not opt out of its current obligations and continue to support the ICC. 
                                                 
206 Article 52 of the Charter of the United Nations.    
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
 
 
5.1. Summary of Key Findings 
This Research Paper has established that despite the initial support by Africa 
toward international criminal justice, there has been shift in the collective 
perception of African States towards the system. While some of the concerns of 
African States may be misplaced or overstated, others remain relevant 
although unfortunately remained unaddressed.  
The tensions between the UNSC and the application of universal jurisdiction in 
particular have led the AU to consider empowering the African Court of Justice 
and Human Rights with an international crimes mandate.  
While this process is still in its tentative stages, should the AU choose to 
proceed in vesting the Court with criminal jurisdiction, it will face many legal 
and practical challenges especially given the related resource inputs required 
and the current low rates of compliance with decisions of African institutions. 
Notwithstanding, an empowered African Court serving as a regional 
complement to the ICC may serve to widen the impunity net especially given 
the host of new crimes proposed under its jurisdiction.  
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5.2. Recommendations 
5.2.1. Recommendations With Respect to the Work of the International 
Criminal Court 
The author recommends, with respect to the continued uncertainty around the 
jurisdiction of the ICC with respect to non states parties that the AU or its 
members make use of the dispute settlement mechanism provided for under 
Article 199 and Rule 195 of the Rome Statute and the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence of the ICC respectively. An advisory opinion of the International Court 
of Justice on this issue would be useful in clarifying the matter.  
African States should also make better use of their dominant position at the 
Assembly of States Parties to identify better working guidelines for the exercise 
of prosecutorial discretion.  
 
5.2.2. Recommendations With Respect to the Role of the United 
Nations Security Council   
The AU proposal for amendment of Article 16 of Rome Statute to allow the UN 
General Assembly to assume the mandate of the UNSC where it has abdicated 
in its duties will serve to ensure that the Security Council is compelled to at 
minimum consider requests for deferral. Given the progressive nature of the 
proposal, AU Member States should coalesce with other members of the Like 
Minded Group ensure that the proposal is passed at the ASP.  
However, in the long term, AU member states should work towards general 
reform of the UNSC as there is a need for the organ to be more representative 
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and democratic. The current status quo is beginning to undermine the 
legitimacy of international justice especially in the context of the ICC‟s work.  
 
5.2.3. Recommendations in Respect to Empowering the African Court 
While the idea of an empowered African Court as a regional complement is 
welcomed, the endeavour should not be rushed on the sole basis of existing 
tensions between the Union and international criminal justice actors. Given the 
need to make adequate arrangements with respect to resourcing the Court, in 
the short term the AU should encourage and assist Member States to upgrade 
their respective judiciaries to give them competence over international crimes.  
AU Member States should also increase their resolve in complying with 
decisions of the African Commission on Human and Peoples‟ Rights and other 
Union organs.  
 
5.3. Conclusion  
International law is a rapidly advancing field and Africa has much to contribute. 
Africa‟s role as one of the largest actors in international criminal justice is likely 
to substantially affect and shape the development of international criminal law.  
Despite the existing tensions and pressures existing between the AU and 
international justice actors, the international community as a whole must focus 
on the need to end impunity and securing justice for victims of international 
crimes. This will inevitably involve reflecting on the current progress down the 
path of international justice and correcting the course where necessary.  
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With respect to the ambitions of the AU to extend the jurisdiction of the African 
Court, for this process to be a successful, the AU and its Member States most 
continue to foster through their actions commitment to end impunity. Further, in 
as much as the development of an international crimes mandate for the African 
Court as a regional complement to the jurisdiction of the ICC will be beneficial, 
African States must also ensure that the Court is sufficiently capacitated to 
effectively deliver its mandate.  
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